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The Trump administration has drawn an unflattering spotlight on 
what long had been a dormant feature of federalism—there are deep 
fissures between the federal government and leading state 
governments on questions of foreign policy. The confrontation 
between states, led by California, and the United States federal 
government regarding climate change policy puts these fissures on full 
display.2 California has assumed the mantle of defending the Paris 
 
 2.  Nadja Popovich, California Is Ready for a Fight Over Tailpipe Emissions. Here’s Why, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/30/climate/california-
auto-emissions.html.  
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Agreement on climate change against its express disavowal by the 
federal government.3 
Initiatives such as these by California and other like-minded states 
raise significant constitutional questions. The Supreme Court has 
noted that states should not impair the President’s ability to “speak 
for the Nation with one voice.”4 But as the headlines proclaim, 
California and Washington State Join Carbon Pledge in Defiance of 
Trump.5 They have done so, for instance, by joining “five nations on 
the Pacific coast of the Americas on Tuesday to agree to step up the 
use of a price on carbon dioxide emissions as a central economic 
policy to slow climate change.”6 California is acting on its pledge by 
implementing state law to that effect.7 California is thus defying 
federal foreign policy by entering into its own agreements with 
foreign states and implementing its own laws to have an impact on 
foreign policy. This is facially difficult to reconcile with the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncement on executive foreign affairs powers quoted 
above.8 
Dean Harold Koh’s recent contribution to the debate about the 
foreign policy of the Trump administration sheds further light on the 
potential constitutional volatility of California’s conduct.9 Koh notes 
that California’s conduct was consistent with how participants in a 
transnational legal process would be expected to act and encouraged 
California and other states to continue to resist the Trump 
 
 3.  Evan Halper, A California-led Alliance of Cities and States Vows to Keep the Paris 
Climate Accord Intact, L.A. TIMES (June 2, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-
paris-states-2017062-story.html.   
 4.  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000). 
 5.  California and Washington State join Carbon Pledge in Defiance of Trump, REUTERS 
(Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-summit-americas/california-
and-washington-state-join-carbon-pledge-in-defiance-of-trump-idUSKBN1E625E.  
 6.  Id. 
 7.  See Tori James, Brown’s Final Budget Emphasizes Signature Efforts, MML NEWS 
(June 27, 2018), https://www.mymotherlode.com/news/local/374471/browns-final-budget-
emphasizes-signature-efforts.html (“The $1.4 billion Cap and Trade Expenditure Plan 
within Brown’s final budget outlines program expenditures to further reduce carbon pollution 
and support climate resiliency efforts.”). 
 8.  Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381. 
 9.  See Harold Hongju Koh, International Law vs. Donald Trump, A Reply, OPINIO JURIS 
(Mar. 5, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/03/05/international-law-vs-donald-trump-a-reply/ 
(“[O]ther American climate actors—states and localities, private companies and NGOs, the 
bureaucracy—should make clear to the international actors seeking to preserve the Paris 
accords that Donald Trump does not own the process or speak entirely for America. Norm-
internalization goes all the way down.”). 
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administration.10 Koh first developed the now dominant transnational 
legal process theory to explain why states obey international law in 
the absence of a global policeman: domestic governmental actors 
interact with foreign governments and civil society representatives on 
a regular basis; this interaction causes each participant to interpret the 
claims made by the other actors by reference to a shared international 
legal framework; and this interpretation in turn will lead each side to 
internalize the respective norm commitments of the other in domestic 
law without need for a global policeman.11 California’s defiance of the 
Trump administration, according to Koh, is simply an expression of its 
norm internalization of the claims made by the global community 
pursuant to the Paris Agreement.12 
Koh’s contribution meaningfully moves the ball. It describes why 
and how California and other states act in defiance of the President: 
they act to protect norms they internalized as transnational legal 
process participants.13 This description moves the Californian 
experience into a broader legal context beyond the current policy 
battles between majority Democratic states and the Trump 
administration. In other words, Koh’s rubric gives us the opening not 
to ask the politically loaded question: may California defy the Trump 
administration? Instead, we can ask: are states constitutionally 
permitted to participate in transnational legal processes even when 
such participation has the potential to give rise to state laws defying 
federal foreign policy? 
The answer to this reframed question is far from obvious. The U.S. 
Supreme Court in American Insurance Association v. Garamendi held 
that “the exercise of the federal executive [foreign affairs] authority 
means that state law must give way where, as here, there is evidence of 
clear conflict between the policies adopted by the two.”14 This answer 
on its face suggests that federal foreign policy can always overrule 
state law to the extent that there is “clear conflict between the 
policies” in question.15 Such a reading of Garamendi would thus shut 
the door on meaningful state participation in transnational legal 
 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  See Harold H. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 194–206 (1996) 
[hereinafter Koh TLP] (explaining how the transnational legal process functions).  
 12.  See Harold H. Koh, International Law vs. Donald Trump, A Reply, OPINIO JURIS 
(Mar. 5, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/03/05/international-law-vs-donald-trump-a-reply/. 
 13.  See id. 
 14.  Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003). 
 15.  See id. 
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processes without at least tacit federal approval. It also would mean 
that, transnational legal process or not, state attempts to act as a check 
on federal foreign policy would be per se unconstitutional. 
As discussed in Part I, the foreign affairs law literature submits 
that this conclusion is not warranted upon a review of constitutional 
jurisprudence as a whole. This literature, led by Jack Goldsmith from 
the conservative side and Michael Glennon and Robert Sloane from 
the liberal side, suggests that there is significant room for state action 
in foreign affairs.16 These scholars each submit further that Supreme 
Court jurisprudence is more nuanced than what the traditional sound-
bites of Presidential exclusivity over foreign affairs would suggest.17 
As Part I concludes, however, this literature stands on shaky 
grounds precisely in the extreme scenario of state resistance to a 
federal foreign policy of defection from an existing global consensus 
and towards greater isolation. Goldsmith’s submissions on state 
powers stand in the context of an avowedly anti-cosmopolitan 
outlook.18 Glennon’s and Sloane’s contribution on state collaboration 
with foreign counterparties, on the other hand, is professedly 
globalist.19 Both lines of thoughts run to their underlying value 
commitments when addressing the question whether states may act as 
a globalist champion of last resort to stop federal policies of 
isolationism. Constitutional discourse would thus again threaten to 
revert to politics. 
As Part II articulates, this problem can be avoided by approaching 
the question of states’ powers through a lens inspired by transnational 
legal process scholarship. This scholarship is instructive because it 
provides a more accurate description of state behavior in a globalized 
world order compared to the pre-globalization lens of “foreign 
affairs” still dominant in the constitutional literature. Thus, the 
constitutional literature misses constitutionally critical nuances about 
the contemporary regulatory interactions between state and 
municipal actors and their foreign counterparts that are the bread and 
 
 16.  See Jack Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 
1617, 1623 (1997); MICHAEL J. GLENNON & ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
FEDERALISM, THE MYTH OF NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY (2016). 
 17.  See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1623, 1682; GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 
353. 
 18.  See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, 
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1852 (2009); Jack Goldsmith, Liberal 
Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1667, 1677–78 (2003). 
 19.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 229. 
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butter of leading descriptive theories such as transnational legal 
process and the related global governance network scholarship. 
Part II explains that states participate in transnational legal 
processes when they join global governance networks. Such networks 
form when state legislators and regulators exchange with foreign 
counterparts or global civil society actors to discuss joint problems.20 
They thus provide fertile ground for transnational legal processes to 
take hold in state legislatures and government offices. 
Part II then explains how state participation in transnational legal 
processes predictably leads to friction between state and federal 
actors. Transnational legal process is context dependent: it internalizes 
norms in light of a specific context for interaction with foreign 
counterparts or a specific network.21 But there are many global 
governance networks. These networks naturally resist and compete 
with each other for greater influence over policymaking along 
predicable lines.22 Knowing the type of actors involved—federal 
government actors and state actors in a federal system—it is thus 
possible to map where, when, and how this resistance will occur in 
light of this competitive dynamic. 
Part II contributes to the literature, which currently treats these 
conflicts indiscriminately pursuant to the traditional monolithic 
“foreign affairs” rubric, by mapping the underlying conflict potential 
in five states of resistance, providing practical examples for each. The 
first state of resistance arises when state laws seek to prevent a federal 
defection from global governance networks. This is the current 
California scenario. The second state of resistance arises when state 
actors participate on one side of an ongoing network conflict between 
different federal constituencies. For example, a state could pass 
 
 20.  See ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 38 (2004) (discussing the 
formation of regulatory networks); Koh TLP, supra note 11, at 194–206 (explaining how the 
transnational legal process functions); see also Melissa Waters, Normativity in the “New” 
Schools: Assessing the Legitimacy of International Legal Norms Created by Domestic Courts, 32 
YALE J. INT’L L. 455, 456 (2007) (noting the common points between these different schools). 
For the broader governance literature, see, e.g., EYAL BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE passim (2014); Harold H. Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN ST. 
INT’L L. REV. 745, 751 (2006) (linking transnational legal process with global governance); Nico 
Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the 
International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2006) (“[M]uch of global governance can be 
understood as regulation and administration, and that we are witnessing the emergence of a 
‘global administrative space . . . .’”).  
 21.  See Koh TLP, supra note 11, at 194–206. 
 22.  See Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1578–79 
(2011). 
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legislation to bar any affiliate of a company doing business in a 
country known for its abysmal human rights record from participation 
in state contracts, in conflict with federal free trade policies. In this 
context, states act as a catalyst for more definite federal action to 
resolve the latent federal policy conflict (e.g., the conflict between 
members of the federal government participating in both human 
rights and trade networks). The third state of resistance involves the 
formation of networks from which federal actors are totally absent, 
such as networks forming between sub-national government units 
along an international border. In this context, states can meaningfully 
advance their own traditional interests by exchanging with foreign 
actors on the most effective means to implement these interests into 
policy. The fourth state of resistance sees states acting as a drag on 
federal policy, particularly in areas of traditional state interests such as 
the prosecution of criminal defendants in state court. The fifth state of 
resistance, finally, concerns the disagreement between state and 
federal officials about how far to promote norm internalization in a 
shared network space such as environmental or health law. Each of 
these conflicts meaningfully differs from the others. They further 
showcase that the current defection scenario is but a small piece to a 
larger constitutional puzzle. 
So far, scholarship has not answered the crucial question: what is 
the constitutional significance of state participation in transnational 
legal processes and global governance networks? Part III proposes 
that the Compact Clause provides the best constitutional perspective 
to understand this state participation in, and resistance through, 
global governance networks.23 Part III draws an important 
constitutional distinction between state coordination with foreign 
actors and state cooperation with foreign actors. It explains that 
coordination looks for the immediate achievement by the state of its 
regulatory goals by participating in a network. Cooperation, on the 
other hand, involves a bargained-for exchange. Part III submits that 
under the Compact Clause, states may independently coordinate with 
foreign actors through their participation in global governance 
networks but must not cooperate with them without federal approval. 
In determining whether states had the requisite authority to 
coordinate with regard to any specific measure, courts will balance the 
link of the state measure to traditional police powers against the 
 
 23.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
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intrusion of the measure upon traditional federal foreign policy 
prerogatives.24 
Part III advances the literature by showcasing that even cases 
criticized by most scholars now fit within a broader transnational 
process paradigm.25 This approach is therefore descriptively more 
capacious and doctrinally more accurate than the existing 
contributions because of its more granular transnational legal process 
lens. Part III also shows how this paradigm can explain why trends of 
constitutional normalization of foreign affairs law currently coexist 
with trends of obvious foreign affairs exceptionalism, thus 
underscoring its descriptive appeal.26 
Part IV then sets out to remap the states of resistance developed 
in Part II over this new rubric. Part IV concludes that state 
governments may create any of the states of resistance outlined in 
Part II and thus participate as constitutive actors on the global stage 
by exercising their state laws or regulations. Part IV also explains that 
the federal government is not powerless to exact counter-pressure 
and ultimately preempt such state laws or regulations. Part IV will use 
the constitutional paradigm developed so far to chart what federal 
response will suffice to overcome each state of resistance. 
Part V will conclude with an appraisal of why state participation in 
global governance networks is in fact desirable. First, it brings 
federalist checks and balances to foreign affairs. The Constitution 
empowers states to act as a meaningful check on the president in 
foreign affairs. But the Article ultimately concludes that the greatest 
benefit of state participation is that it acts as a catalyst to apply the 
transnational legal process to itself in the other conflict scenarios. 
Transnational legal process can create centrifugal forces by driving 
policy actors in different administrative departments to enter into 
their own competing governance networks. State participation forces 
engagement across these networks in fruitful ways. It thus provides a 
 
 24.  Part III will also defend the balancing approach against the criticism preemptively 
raised against such an approach by Glennon and Sloane. See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 
16, at 133–35. 
 25.  See generally Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). For critiques of Zschernig, see, 
e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1629; GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 103–21; Ganesh 
Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Affairs, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 
1918 (2015). 
 26.  See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 25, at 1918; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, 
Presidential Control Over International Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1263 (2018). 
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previously un-theorized means to integrate the value commitments 
propagated in nearly all transnational legal processes with each other. 
I. STATES, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 
A. The Commonplace View: National Exclusivity 
Most lawyers have two preconceptions about the constitutional 
assignment of foreign affairs powers. First, states have no business 
participating in foreign affairs.27 Second, the Constitution reserves 
foreign affairs powers to the President.28 This commonplace 
understanding finds its doctrinal home in the “dormant foreign affairs 
clause.”29 
The Constitution lends some textual support to the first 
proposition that the federal government alone holds foreign affairs 
powers. Article I, section 10 of the Constitution provides that “No 
State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation.”30 It 
continues that states also are prohibited to “grant Letters of Marque 
and Reprisal.”31 
Article I, section 10 second addresses the question of import 
duties—a critical question on the control of foreign trade at the time 
of the drafting of the constitution.32 Article I, section 10 makes clear 
that the overall supremacy on questions of import duties lies with 
Congress and that states may act only with Congressional 
acquiescence.33 To remove further temptations of state adventurism, 
Article I, section 10 provides that “the net Produce of all Duties and 
Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use 
 
 27.  See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968) (“That kind of state involvement in 
foreign affairs and international relations—matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the 
Federal Government—is not sanctioned by Clark v. Allen.”); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 
572 (1840) (the Framers “anxiously desired to cut off all connection or communication between 
a state and a foreign power . . . .”).  
 28.  See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003) (the “President [is] to speak 
for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments . . . .”). 
 29.  See Garrick Pursley, Dormancy, 100 GEO. L.J. 500, 500, 552–61 (2012) (theorizing 
dormant foreign affairs through the lens of a state preclusion thesis that “[s]tate governments 
may not take actions that undermine the constitutionally established structure of government of 
which they are a part.”). 
 30.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  See G. Edward White, The Political Economy of the Original Constitution, 35 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 71–75 (2012) (discussing the political background of the imports and 
exports duties provision in Article I). 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
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of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject 
to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.”34 
Article I, section 10 further lays out that states also do not have 
powers to conduct war, save in extreme cases.35 This reserves again 
one of the key foreign affairs powers—the power to wage war to 
vindicate international rights—with the federal government.36 
Finally, the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause is explicit that treaty 
commitments of the United States displace the constitution and laws 
of the several states.37 It thus again provides support for a broader 
proposition of federal foreign affairs supremacy over the states.38 
The Constitution on its face is less supportive of the second 
commonplace preconception that the executive is vested with 
supreme foreign affairs powers.39 It provides in Article II, section 2 
only that the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the 
Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls.”40 Nevertheless, from at least the 1790s, 
the initiative in foreign affairs was vested in the Presidency.41 This 
initiative was, however, subject to Congressional oversight.42 
As recent literature has demonstrated, the commonplace 
understanding of federal exclusivity in the context of foreign affairs 
on closer inspection greatly oversimplifies the federalist architecture 
of the Constitution.43 To begin with, the constitutional text does not 
 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 36.  See OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, HOW A RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW 
WAR REMADE THE WORLD 96 (2017) (discussing the role of war in international law at the 
time of the nation’s founding). 
 37.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 38.  See Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-
Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1587 (2003) (“The Supremacy Clause makes clear that 
treaties can override inconsistent state law . . . .”). 
 39.  See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 707 
(2000) (“The conventional view is that deference to the executive branch concerning the 
meaning of customary international law is covered by essentially the same rule governing 
treaties: Courts are to give substantial weight to the executive branch’s interpretation so that the 
United States generally will speak with one voice in foreign affairs.”). 
 40.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 41.  Frederic G. Sourgens, The Paris Paradigm, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming June 
2019), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3125923.  
 42.  See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1682–83. 
 43.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 353 (arguing that the Constitution “permit[s] 
states to act unless Congress has clearly prohibited them from doing so”); see Jack Goldsmith, 
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completely displace state powers to conduct foreign affairs.44 It 
creates a space for coexistence between the states and the federal 
government. On its face, so long as Congress does not object and so 
long as it does not conflict with the foreign policy of the United States, 
there is little that would prevent the states from engaging in foreign 
policy of their own.45 In fact, states are reasonably active in 
communicating with foreign governments with regard to issues that 
affect their respective economic interests.46 State trade missions 
abroad to woo investments are one such frequent example.47 
Further, the impact of state conduct on foreign affairs does not 
automatically give the federal government a right to preempt the 
execution of state laws. Thus, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in several cases held that the murder convictions of defendants in 
state court violated international law requirements of consular 
notification.48 The International Court of Justice further ordered the 
United States to halt the executions.49 
The issue had significant foreign policy implications as the United 
States had a treaty obligation to comply with the ICJ’s decision.50 
Texas and other states refused to heed the decision by the 
International Court of Justice or a request by President Bush to halt 
the execution in question, forcing litigation on the issue of whether 
 
Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1682–83 (1997) 
(discussing the current view that Congress must act to preempt state conduct internationally). 
 44.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 20 (pointing out that no constitutional 
provision exists vesting exclusive foreign affairs powers in the federal government). 
 45.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 353 (arguing that the Constitution “permit[s] 
states to act unless Congress has clearly prohibited them from doing so”); Goldsmith, supra note 
16, at 1682–83 (discussing the current view that Congress must act to preempt state conduct 
internationally). 
 46.  See Section II.B. 
 47.  See, e.g., Trade Missions, Cal. Gov. Office of Bus. & Econ. Dev., 
http://www.business.ca.gov/Programs/International-Affairs-and-Business-Development/ 
International-Trade-Promotion/Trade-Missions (last visited June 1, 2018) (summarizing 
California’s foreign trade missions); Trade Missions, Empire St. Dev., https://esd.ny.gov/ 
international/trademissions.html (last visited June 1, 2018) (summarizing New York’s foreign 
trade missions); Christopher Fryer, Bevin Takes Kentucky Delegation to Asia for Trade Mission, 
LOUISVILLE BUS. FIRST (May 17, 2018), https://www.bizjournals.com/louisville/news/2018/05/17/ 
bevin-takes-kentucky-delegation-to-asia-for-trade.html (reporting on recent Kentucky trade 
mission to Asia). 
 48.  See Bruno Simma & Carsten Hoppe, From Lagrand and Avena to Medellin – A Rocky 
Road Towards Implementation, 14 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7 (2005) (discussing the cases in 
question). 
 49.  See id. at 22–26. 
 50.  See id. 
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the executions could proceed.51 The issue ultimately reached the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas; the Court sided with Texas.52 The 
lead complainant in the Supreme Court case, José Medellin, was 
executed shortly after the decision was rendered.53 Plainly, the 
invocation of foreign affairs powers by the federal government had 
little impact even in a case of clear conflict between the federal 
foreign policy to abide by the ICJ’s judgment and state law requiring 
the execution of the criminal defendant in violation of that 
judgment.54 These gaps in the commonplace understanding of foreign 
affairs powers showcase that the relationship between the states and 
the federal government are more nuanced than might at first appear. 
B. The Current Paradigm: Co-operation and National Supremacy 
1. Rebuffing Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption 
Jack Goldsmith’s 1997 article Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs and 
Federalism revolutionized the current debate on the role of states in 
foreign affairs and began to point out the gaps in the commonplace 
understanding outlined above.55 Goldsmith’s core submission is that 
globalization has washed away the distinction between “traditional 
areas” of foreign relations and more traditional areas of domestic 
policy.56 This shift, in turn, necessitates a reappraisal of classical 
foreign relations jurisprudence appearing to prohibit state action in 
foreign affairs reached against this more traditional background 
condition.57 This new state of affairs could certainly lead to conflict 
between the states and the federal government on questions that 
 
 51.  See id. at 26–56 (discussing the various leading decisions prior to the Medellin U.S. 
Supreme Court decision). 
 52.  See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525–32 (2008) (holding that the treaty obligations 
would only preempt state convictions if the treaties in question were self-executing and holding 
that they were not). 
 53.  Allan Turner, Medellin Executed for Rape, Murder of Houston Teens, HOUS. CHRON. 
(Aug. 5, 2008), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Medellin-executed-for-rape-
murder-of-Houston-1770696.php.  
 54.  For a discussion of Medellin, see, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 1263 
(2018); GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 239–43; Oona A. Hathaway et al., International 
Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 51, 70–76 (2012). 
 55.  See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1671. For the continued relevance of Goldsmith’s 
article and discussions agreeing with its principal points, see, e.g., GLENNON & SLOANE, supra 
note 16, at 353; Sirataman & Wuerth, supra note 25, at 1918; Edward L. Rubin, The Role of 
Federalism in International Law, 40 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 195, 198 (2017). 
 56.  Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1671. 
 57.  See id. (globalization “reflect[s] a significant increase in international cooperation, 
coordination, and regulation that has blurred the distinction between foreign and domestic 
relations along several axes. ”). 
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involve foreign relations. But Goldsmith’s overarching assertion is 
that: 
[t]he presence of such externalities does not, by itself, justify 
federal judicial lawmaking. In the absence of a serious breakdown 
in the political process, our constitutional democracy normally 
depends on the elected federal political branches to correct this 
sort of problem. Political instead of judicial federalization is 
especially warranted here since the values to be attached to the 
competing federalism and foreign relations interests appear 
increasingly contested.58 
Goldsmith argues that Congress retains the ability to preempt 
state law directly, should it wish to do so.59 Noting that Congress lacks 
the institutional capability to address many foreign affairs matters 
promptly, Goldsmith further submits that the executive can act within 
its own foreign affairs powers or delegated powers to preempt state 
law when it deems that this is necessary.60 
Goldsmith’s argument is deeply critical of Supreme Court 
decisions that purported to carve out broad foreign affairs powers 
exclusively for the federal government. The principal such case is the 
1968 decision in Zschernig v. Miller.61 In Zschernig, the Supreme 
Court invalidated an Oregon inheritance law requiring that foreign 
nationals could inherit property from an Oregon estate only to the 
extent that the foreign national’s home law would guarantee that the 
national would have a right to hold that property.62 The law was 
implicitly anti-communist, as it required foreign jurisdictions to 
recognize a right to private property for their nationals to qualify as 
heirs in Oregon.63 The Court ruled that the law unduly impinged on 
federal foreign affairs powers.64 
 
 58.  Id. at 1679.  
 59.  Id. at 1681–83. 
 60.  See id. at 1684 (“When the executive branch identifies harmful state foreign relations 
activity, it is much better positioned than Congress to address it. Foreign relations is (and is 
perceived to be) the President’s responsibility. He is thus more accountable for foreign relations 
problems than Congress, and has a greater interest in redressing state-created foreign relations 
difficulties.”). 
 61.  Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
 62.  Id. at 440. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 441 (“The Oregon law does, indeed, illustrate the dangers which are involved if 
each State, speaking through its probate courts, is permitted to establish its own foreign 
policy.”). 
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For Goldsmith, the Zschernig Court sought to resolve a problem 
that did not exist.65 The federal executive had submitted an amicus 
brief in which it confirmed that the Oregon law had not “unduly 
interfered” with federal foreign policy interests.66 Congress had not 
acted to preempt the law, nor was there a treaty in place that would 
have impeded the law’s application.67 The decision thus epitomized 
judicial overreach in arrogating to the courts the power to conduct an 
“independent assessment of the foreign relations consequences of 
applying state law.”68 And it did so without textual, historical, or 
functional support.69 
Goldsmith’s inversion of our commonplace understanding—and 
of Zschernig—has become the new normal. In one of the seminal 
studies on state foreign affairs powers, Glennon and Sloane conclude 
that courts should “except in extraordinary circumstances, permit the 
states to act unless Congress has clearly prohibited them from doing 
so.”70 Glennon and Sloane follow closely along a similar logical path 
to Goldsmith in criticizing dormant foreign affairs preemption.71 
Others have argued along similar lines that there is simply no textual 
or functional basis to continue to imply a dormant foreign affairs 
power in the federal government.72 
2. Limiting Dormant Foreign Commerce Preemption 
Glennon and Sloane in particular pushed back further against 
another kind of dormancy doctrine with relevance to foreign affairs: 
the dormant foreign commerce clause. The dormant foreign 
commerce doctrine arises out of the commerce clause in Article I, 
section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution, which provides that Congress 
 
 65.  See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1629. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  See id. at 1698 (“Many of the just-identified problems of a federal common law of 
foreign relations—disincentives for political branch action in this context, decentralization of 
the federal foreign relations lawmaking process, and nonuniformity of federal foreign relations 
law—are thus not present in a world governed by state law in the absence of a controlling 
federal enactment.”). 
 70.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 353. 
 71.  Id. at 129–45. 
 72.  See, e.g., David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953, 967 (2014) 
(noting the jurisprudential shift away from Zschernig preemption); Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra 
note 25, at 1979 (“In the decades since the end of the Cold War, however, the Court has said a 
great deal about foreign affairs. Perhaps surprisingly, most of what it has said is that foreign 
relations law is not so exceptional after all. Scholars too have come to the same conclusion.”). 
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shall have the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States.”73 The dormant foreign commerce 
clause has the potential effect to create a new dormant foreign affairs 
clause because “cars, locomotives, refrigerators, clocks, pens, aircraft 
engines, and so—all go through a serpentine international odyssey.”74 
Exclusive authority to regulate such broad global commerce would 
come to the same result as the authority to regulate all of foreign 
affairs. 
Glennon and Sloane push back against such an expansive reading 
of the dormant foreign commerce clause. They note the clause’s close 
textual relation to the interstate commerce clause. They conclude that 
structurally and functionally, there is nothing inherently different 
about global trade compared to interstate trade and that the same 
two-factor test governing the dormant interstate-commerce clause 
should also govern the dormant foreign commerce clause: first, 
discrimination against interstate state commerce is per se invalid; 
second, nondiscriminatory regulations are invalid if “the burden 
imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to local 
benefits.”75 This limitation significantly restricts any dormant foreign 
affairs preemptive effect of the clause. 
3. Remaining Disagreement: State Autonomy vs. Global 
Cooperation 
The literature on its face agrees in its rejection of broad dormant 
foreign affairs or broad dormant foreign commerce clause 
preemption, thus carving out an apparent consensus on the 
permissibility of state action in foreign affairs. This facial agreement is, 
however, potentially misleading. Scholars such as Goldsmith on the 
one end and Glennon and Sloane on the other end may well agree 
that states have a broader freedom from federal constraint. But their 
normative starting points are meaningfully different in ways that have 
profound practical implications. 
Thus, much of what animates Goldsmith in rejecting broad 
“common law” doctrines preempting state conduct affecting foreign 
affairs is a concern for democratic autonomy.76 Goldsmith’s distrust of 
 
 73.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 74.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 149. 
 75.  Id. at 171, 178. The only additional factors jurisprudence has recognized beyond these 
two classic interstate tests concern tax measures. Id. at 171. 
 76.  Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1631 (discussing the concept of judge-made foreign 
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this “common law of foreign affairs” is that it is not checked by 
democratic political processes.77 These democratic political processes, 
he notes, in turn do suffice to check aberrant state behavior that truly 
interferes with federal foreign policy.78 
Goldsmith’s scholarship and the work of other like-minded 
scholars places this autonomy in juxtaposition to broader cooperative 
international norms.79 In the first instance, Goldsmith’s project of 
critiquing a foreign affairs “common law” not only wishes to create 
broader leeway for action for the states.80 It is married with a related 
project to attack the inclusion of the world’s common law—that is, 
customary international law—in federal common law, as well.81 
Both attacks, the attack on federal foreign affairs “common law” 
and the attack on the inclusion of customary international law in 
federal common law, are motivated by the value of democratic 
 
relations common law); Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 18, at 1852 (“One important reason 
why democratic states do not engage in more cosmopolitan action is because the citizens and 
elected officials in those states do not support it. This is not just a practical constraint on the 
realization of moral good but also, for many, a competing moral imperative, grounded in the 
moral claims of democratic self-government.”). 
 77.  Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1623 (“The federal political branches are much better at 
redressing state intrusions on federal foreign relations prerogatives, and the federal courts much 
worse, than is commonly thought. Thus, there is little need for a federal common law of foreign 
relations, and good reason to believe that federal courts do not develop this law in a fashion that 
achieves its stated goals.”); id. at 1668 (“But even if they had access to the information 
possessed by the political branches and even if foreign relations training were a prerequisite to 
judicial service, they still would not be well-suited to make such determinations. Judges lack 
national political accountability.”). 
 78.  Id. at 1623. 
 79.  See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 18, at 1852 (“In moral theory and international 
law alike, there is no easy escape from the challenge of reconciling normative constraints and 
demands on the state with the traditional claims of state sovereignty and self-determination.”). 
 80.  See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1681–83. 
 81.  See Curtis Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 861–62 (1997) 
(linking the rejection of customary international law as federal common law directly to 
federalism concerns); Jack L. Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal 
Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673, 708 (1998) (“Erie’s constitutional holding says that state or 
federal law must supply the authorization for federal courts to apply customary international 
law.”); Jack L. Goldsmith & Curtis Bradley, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of 
International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260, 2264 (1998) (noting that the customary 
international law applied by federal courts following Filartiga “differed in crucial respects from 
the CIL applied in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” by including human rights 
norms inconsistent with Erie); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the 
Resemblance between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 
639, 672 (2000) (“Modern CIL is mostly aspirational, just as old CIL was. With old and new CIL 
alike, nations mouth their agreement to popular ideals as long as there is no cost in doing so, but 
abandon their commitments as soon as there is a pressing military or economic or domestic 
reason to do so.”). 
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political accountability—or “democratic self-determination.”82 When 
federal courts act to preempt state conduct on the grounds of foreign 
affairs “common law” doctrines, unelected judges override the 
promulgation of elected state executives and legislatures.83 When 
federal courts rule on the basis of customary international law, they 
impose norms on the nation that are not derived from any national 
popular will but rather emanate from an amorphous world 
community without any legislative imprimatur.84 
The point of this line of scholarship therefore is to provide 
freedom for the states to act autonomously to represent the distinct 
wishes of their constituencies. It rejects foreign affairs 
exceptionalism—the notion that foreign affairs are a special sphere of 
extra-constitutional federal power—in favor of a form of American 
exceptionalism.85 
Glennon and Sloane, on the other hand, are concerned with 
increasing global cooperation.86 In rejecting federal preemption, they 
wish to make space for collaborative, cosmopolitan efforts by states 
and civil society at large.87 They see states as a key actor in regulating 
globalization. But, unlike Goldsmith, they embrace the globalization 
premise that greater social and economic interconnection can only be 
guided and tamed by greater legal interconnection.88 
When placed in the broader framework of Sloane’s scholarship, 
and the frame of his jurisprudential outlook, state participation in 
foreign affairs captures important social policy processes.89 This 
project begins from the assumption that there exists a normatively 
 
 82.  Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional 
Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1845 (2009) (“If classical state sovereignty is on its 
way to obsolescence, democratic self-determination stands ready to take its place.”). 
 83.  See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1668. 
 84.  See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1712–13; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 81. 
 85.  See Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1667, 1677–78 (2003) (noting that cosmopolitan actions by the United States are obviated by 
democratic constraints). 
 86.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 38–39 (noting state action in the face of federal 
paralysis through cooperation on standards and best practices). 
 87.  Id. at 299 (“[L]ocal actors at the state and municipal levels took the initiative to 
advance values (e.g., political reform in Burma, international human rights protection) that 
might otherwise have been marginalized.”). 
 88.  Compare id. (outlining cosmopolitan value of state action) with Goldsmith, supra note 
85, at 1677–78 (noting that cosmopolitan actions by the United States are obviated by 
democratic constraints). 
 89.  See Robert D. Sloane, More Than What Courts Do: Jurisprudence, Decision, and 
Dignity – In Brief Encounters in Global Affairs, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 517, 522 (2009) (discussing 
the importance of diverse constitutive actors in legal processes). 
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(and legally) relevant world society and that domestic legal processes 
simply reflect and participate in these global legal processes.90 It thus 
rejects as jejune the notion that Rousseauian communal sovereignty 
somehow suffices to isolate any one society from the world “out 
there.”91 
This scholarship’s goal is in many ways the opposite of 
Goldsmith’s. It wants to increase the autonomy of states by permitting 
them to cooperate more fully with the world community.92 The distinct 
wishes of constituencies are meaningful because they engage with and 
participate in world social process beyond their own town and state 
limits.93 It rejects foreign affairs exceptionalism and American 
exceptionalism in order to preserve American leadership in tackling 
pressing world problems.94 
This difference in normative outlook has important practical 
consequences. Most starkly, and as is most immediately intuitive, both 
lines of scholarship disagree with each other on whether customary 
international law preempts contrary state law. Customary 
international law still provides a good part of the scaffolding for 
international legal cooperation to take place.95 Consequently, 
Glennon and Sloane as a matter of outlook reject the hypothesis that 
violations of customary international law should be permissible—and 
provide a well-founded historical analysis to support their point of 
view that customary international law (the law of nations) was always 
intended to be part of the Supremacy Clause as federal common law.96 
The Goldsmithian line of scholarship, as discussed above, rejects this 
submission on Erie and implicit state sovereignty grounds.97 
 
 90.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 38 (“[S]ocial and economic problems can be 
addressed effectively only through cross-border collaboration – necessitating cooperative 
arrangements between states and foreign states.”). 
 91.  Compare id. at 9 (“[T]his vision of republicanism, however, as Rousseau’s Social 
Contract made clear, could not work in the absence of a relatively homogenous small polity. For 
civic virtue to flourish in any polity, citizens must share common values and interests and their 
personal desires must remain consistent with the general will.”) with Goldsmith, supra note 85, 
at 1677–78 (2003) (noting that cosmopolitan actions by the United States are obviated by 
democratic constraints). 
 92.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 38. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 299. 
 95.  See Laurence R. Helfer & Ingrid B. Wuerth, Customary International Law: An 
Instrument Choice Perspective, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L. 563, 609 (2016) (arguing that states will 
continue to choose customary international law despite the rise in codified legal instruments and 
soft law). 
 96.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 253–72. 
 97.  See sources cited supra note 81. 
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This difference in normative outlook also matters in the context of 
traditional states’ rights discourses. The Goldsmithian line of 
argument finds a natural jurisprudential ally in “states’ rights” —and 
traditional areas of state competence. These doctrines have been used 
as a rhetorical and legal bulwark in a context that rarely connoted 
greater national or global inclusion or cooperation.98 To the contrary, 
they have been used to defend local prescriptions against the external 
on a normative foundation that is premised precisely upon the 
superior normative force of the local, Rousseauian community.99 This 
states’ rights outlook allows Goldsmith to defend decisions such as 
Medellin, which refused to apply international legal obligations on the 
states even when the United States had, through its political process, 
ratified core treaties at stake in the dispute (the U.N. Charter and the 
Vienna Convention on the Consular Relations) on the ground that 
these treaties were not self-executing.100 
Glennon and Sloane’s global outlook instead responds to Medellin 
by noting that it is a “recent concrete example of state or local 
foreign-policy initiatives that have clearly and significantly damaged 
the nation as a whole.”101 It bristles at the notion of using traditional 
state areas of competence as a test to limit the foreign affairs powers 
of the federal government.102 States’ rights and states’ powers, in other 
words, are a political lightning rod separating both schools of thought, 
 
 98.  See Jane Dailey, Race, Marriage, and Sovereignty in the New World Order, 10 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 511, 533 (2009) (“[B]y 1950 . . . the argument 
that international human rights norms might trump discriminatory local practices had outpaced 
the domestic political will to support those rights and had, instead, inspired strenuous 
resistance—as demonstrated by the Bricker Amendment and a mounting rhetoric of 
local sovereignty/’states’s rights’.”); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in 
the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 354 (2008) (noting the traditionally conservative rhetoric 
of judicial restraint, originalism, and states’ rights). 
 99.  See H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution: A Belated 
Review, 94 YALE L.J. 1285, 1303 (1985) (noting the historical precedent that 
“states’ rights theorists attempted to avoid the anti-majoritarian implications of their stand by 
contending that the relevant majority was the majority within each individual state; they 
supported this assertion with the claim that the states as bodies politic had preceded and created 
the Union.”). 
 100.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 1263 (describing the Medellin Court’s 
rejection of an executive branch effort to preempt state law); see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 
U.S. 491, 511, 514 (2008). For an interesting discussion linking Medellin to the current 
immigration federalism debate, see David S. Rubenstein, Black-Box Immigration Federalism, 
114 MICH. L. REV. 983, 996 (2016). 
 101.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 142–44. 
 102.  Id. 
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despite their facial agreement on the broader role of states in foreign 
affairs.103 
C. The Conflict Problem: American Insurance Association v. 
Garamendi 
The ideological disagreement between the Goldsmithian and 
Glennon-Sloane conceptions of state participation in foreign affairs 
comes to a head when there are instances of outright conflict between 
the federal government and the state governments on questions of 
foreign policy. Again, both conceptions would carefully seek to avoid 
conflict by parsing disagreements as permitting states to continue to 
have a seat at the table because federal policy has not been 
sufficiently clearly articulated—or not articulated by the right actor. 
But both conceptions would part ways when this avoidance is no 
longer possible because there is a bona fide conflict between state and 
federal foreign policy prerogatives. That scenario would force the 
values motivating their respective positions to come to the fore. 
The U.S. Supreme Court first teed up this problem in American 
Insurance Association v. Garamendi104 in 2003. Garamendi involved 
Californian legislation requiring insurance companies doing business 
in California to disclose all policies sold to persons in Europe between 
1920 and 1945, as well as the status of those policies, to assist 
California residents to collect on Holocaust-era claims.105 The 
potential for conflict arose because the federal executive had entered 
into an executive agreement, the German Foundation Agreement, to 
set up a process for the resolution of claims arising against German 
nationals from the National Socialist era.106 The executive agreement 
provided that the parties wished to create an exclusive forum and that 
the federal government would appear in court proceedings involving 
claims covered by the German Foundation Agreement to submit that: 
 
 103.  At the same time, however, there are other contexts in which even Glennon and 
Sloane look to traditional state competencies as a source of power, namely in the context of 
permissible cooperation by states through foreign state compacts. Id. at 289 (“[A] focus on 
traditional state functions may well hold out the promise of a more coherent legal standard for 
assessing Compact Clause issues in the domain of foreign affairs.”). In other words, Glennon 
and Sloane wish to preserve states’ rights to cooperate without necessarily advocating for state 
rights, tout court.  
 104.  539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 105.  See id. at 409 (describing the nature of the California legislation); id. at 402. 
 106.  See id. at 405 (describing the executive agreement). 
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the President of the United States has concluded that it would be 
in the foreign policy interests of the United States for the 
[German] Foundation to be the exclusive forum and remedy for 
the resolution of all asserted claims against German companies 
arising from their involvement in the National Socialist era and 
World War II.107 
As Justice Ginsburg observed in her dissenting opinion, however, 
the German Foundation Agreement was careful to point out that 
“[t]he United States does not suggest that its policy interests 
concerning the Foundation in themselves provide an independent 
legal basis for dismissal.”108 The Supreme Court nevertheless struck 
down the California law because of a conflict between federal foreign 
policy (rather than federal law) and California state law.109 
In the first instance, the Glennon-Sloane view on its face seeks to 
show that this was not an instance of conflict between federal policy 
and state law.110 The federal government took pains to avoid such a 
conflict.111 The judiciary therefore should not have created one where 
the political branches carefully sought to circumnavigate it.112 This 
argument is reminiscent of Goldsmith’s critique of Zschernig, 
authored before Garamendi was decided.113 
A more careful analysis, however, begins to show cracks in this 
avoidance strategy. Thus, Glennon and Sloane point out that federal 
policy should not preempt state law because policy is not law.114 This 
betrays a cooperative bent: federal policy would only ever ripen into 
law (treaty, sole executive agreement, congressional executive 
agreement, etc.) if the federal government sought to cooperate with 
another foreign counterparty.115 
 
 107.  Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility, and the 
Future”, U.S.-Ger., July 17, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1298, 1303. 
 108.  539 U.S. at 436 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1304). 
 109.  See id. at 429 (holding that even though Congress had not acted, the President had 
independent authority in foreign policy and California’s efforts impeded federal policy). 
 110.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 128. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1629. 
 114.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 137. 
 115.  See id. at 136 (“[T]he federal government has the constitutional power to preempt 
state law affirmatively under the Supremacy Clause; if it exercises that power, then, even if the 
state measures taken to advance the shared foreign policy goal prove far more effective than 
federal measures, state law must give way.”). 
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The exit from treaties, sole executive agreements, or congressional 
executive agreements is a federal policy that does not make law.116 It 
is a policy that on its face removes federal law.117 The complaint that 
such policy should not be allowed to preempt state law purely 
because it is policy rather than law rings hollow. It begs the question 
whether the policy of withdrawal of law (and thus withdrawal of 
regulation) should be given force and, if so, what force. Garamendi 
would suggest that it should receive some force.118 Glennon and 
Sloane, predictably given their value commitments to cooperation, 
disagree.119 
The issue does not become easier from the Goldsmithian 
perspective. The removal of federal law on its face should remove 
obstacles for state action.120 But what if the state action in question 
seeks to recreate the cooperative structures from which the federal 
government sought to withdraw? And, what is more, what if the state 
doing so has sufficient economic clout to drive or, at the very least, to 
influence the national market? In that instance, should the absence of 
federal law mean that states should not be allowed to step into the 
void to cooperate in the federal government’s stead? The value 
commitments of the Goldsmithian perspective would certainly 
suggest as much. In fact, Goldsmith has argued against more global 
cooperation without clearer Congressional approval, submitting 
instead that such cooperative opportunities should be delegated to 
the states.121 
This value commitment thus easily could make use of legal 
strategies that require Congressional approval for any cooperation, 
 
 116.  See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers, 53 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 247, 267 (2013) (discussing treaty termination in the context of the Supremacy Clause). 
 117.  See Harold Hongju Koh, Presidential Power to Terminate International Agreements, 
128 YALE L.J. FORUM 432, 454 (2018) (“U.S. withdrawal from a long-standing treaty or 
international organization . . . should not become effective without congressional involvement. 
Such a withdrawal or termination would similarly necessitate unwinding many domestic law 
statutes that the executive could not repeal alone.”) 
 118.  See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 423–24 (2003) (discussing the broad 
discretion that the President has in furthering national policy through economic pressure). 
 119.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 136. 
 120.  Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1664–65 (arguing that in the absence of federal law, state 
law should control).  
 121.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 1254 (“Presidential termination or 
disavowal of international obligations might also negatively impact states. For example, the 
Trump Administration’s effort to pull back from commitments made by the Obama 
Administration to address climate change could have long-term economic and other effects on 
U.S. states, especially along the coastlines.”). 
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including state cooperation, through the Compact Clause. The 
Compact Clause, discussed in detail below, provides that no state shall 
“without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement 
or Compact with another State, or foreign Power.”122 
In a recent article, David Sloss has cautiously noted the potential 
for such an approach to foreign state compacts.123 Sloss’s article 
focused on an agreement between California and Quebec providing 
for a joint cap and trade emissions regime to combat climate 
change.124 Sloss follows in broad outline the analysis of scholars like 
Glennon and Sloane in that he, too, deems that most such agreements 
do not require explicit Congressional authorization.125 
But Sloss focuses upon a prong in interstate compact clause 
litigation that did not receive similar attention from more 
cooperation-minded scholars: can the state withdraw from an 
arrangement at its discretion?126 Noting the importance of withdrawal 
rights in the interstate compact context, Sloss submits that foreign 
state agreements that do not provide for similar means of 
discretionary exit would require Congressional approval127—
essentially because such prospective promises not to withdraw are 
beyond the power of the state to make in its ordinary legislative 
process. Because California bound itself not to withdraw at will, Sloss 
concludes that the agreement with Quebec might well violate the 
Compact Clause absent Congressional approval.128 
This argument, in other words, may allow a doctrinal exit for 
scholars with strong anti-cosmopolitan value commitments to escape 
from their broader commitment to increased state participation in 
foreign affairs when federal policy has been to withdraw from 
international agreements and cooperative structures. Rather than 
 
 122.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.  
 123.  See generally David Sloss, California’s Climate Diplomacy and Dormant Preemption, 
56 WASHBURN L.J. 507 (2017). Sloss did not endorse the position fully as his own but noted it as 
significant doctrinal problem. 
 124.  See id. at 508 (describing the agreement between California and Quebec). 
 125.  Id. at 521–22 (arguing that the agreement between California and Quebec does not 
violate the Compact Clause, even without Congressional approval). 
 126.  See id. at 524–26 (explaining the requirement that a state have unilateral power to 
withdraw from agreement to avoid triggering the Compact Clause).  
 127.  Id. at 524–25. 
 128.  Id. (“If California does not obtain congressional consent for the [agreement with 
Quebec], a court might hold that the Agreement violates the Compact Clause.”).  
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embrace state action, this strategy would vindicate the value of 
Congress as ultimate guardian of democratic self-determination.129 
D. Reframing the Garamendi Discussion 
The above discussion has shown that the literature’s openness to 
greater state participation in foreign affairs hits an impasse precisely 
in the current confrontation between the Trump administration and 
states like California over the Paris Agreement on climate change.130 
It thus cannot so far resolve the potential inconsistency between 
Garamendi and Dean Koh’s analysis that California’s actions were a 
direct result of its participation in the transnational legal process. Koh 
submits that “states and localities . . . should make clear to the 
international actors seeking to preserve the Paris accords that Donald 
Trump does not own the process or speak entirely for America.”131 
Garamendi cautions that “[t]he exercise of the federal executive 
authority means that state law must give way where, as here, there is 
evidence of clear conflict between the policies adopted by the two.”132 
As discussed in the previous section, the literature so far has not 
found a coherent answer as to how far or on what basis states could 
actively resist the express foreign policy of retreat from international 
commitments, ostensibly creating policy space for state action, as 
opposed to the affirmative conclusion of international treaties or 
executive agreements narrowing this space, as was the case in 
Garamendi.133 
Helpfully, Koh’s call to action rests upon a conceptual framework 
that can assist in reframing this conflict problem encountered in the 
foreign affairs literature.134 Koh’s appeal relies upon an extension of 
his transnational legal process theory. Transnational legal process 
theory submits that states comply with international legal obligations 
and act cooperatively on the international stage because they 
internalize norms.135 This internalization occurs after a three-step 
 
 129.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 1254 (explaining that Congress’ Article I 
powers allow it to override presidential actions).  
 130.  See Popovich, supra note 2. (describing the conflict between California and the Trump 
administration). 
 131.  Koh, supra note 9.  
 132.  Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003). 
 133.  Id. at 416 (“Generally, then, valid executive agreements are fit to preempt state law, 
just as treaties are.”). 
 134.  See generally Koh, supra note 9. 
 135.  See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 
2599, 2602 (1996) (positing that global norms are ultimately internalized by domestic legal 
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process. First, participants in a process must interact with each 
other.136 Second, they interpret the statements made by other process 
participants with whom they interact in light of their own frame of 
reference.137 Third, they internalize the commitments of other process 
participants in light of their own interpretive framework.138 
In simple terms, transnational legal process works like our 
proverbial “common sense.” Routine observation of any daily scene 
will confirm that human beings are not born with common sense. 
Rather, they learn it through observation and engagement (and some 
trial and error). When one has learned a “common-sense rule” (say, 
“don’t drive drunk! You will get in an accident!”), one follows this 
rule because one agrees with it and has made it part and parcel of 
one’s own normative expectations how people should conduct 
themselves in the world. We no longer follow the rule “don’t drive 
drunk” because our mother told us not to do it. We follow it because 
we firmly believe it to be in our own best interest to follow the rule. 
Dean Koh’s point about state action in defiance of President 
Trump’s exit from the Paris Agreement is that “[n]orm-internalization 
goes all the way down.”139 Not only does the federal bureaucracy, 
starting with the state department and going through to every other 
leading federal department, internalize international legal norms.140 
Other actors, too, are exposed to the transnational legal process 
through their participation in global governance networks, discussed 
more fully in the next section.141 These actors relevantly include state 
actors.142 
Because of their participation in global governance networks, and 
their interaction with foreign governments, these state actors have 
come to internalize international norms and want to comply with 
 
systems). 
 136.  See id. at 2618 (through an interactive process, “law helps translate claims of legal 
authority into national behavior.”). 
 137.  See id. at 2634 (arguing that in order to understand why nations obey international law, 
one must account for the importance of the interpretation of legal norms). 
 138.  See id. (contending that in order to understand why nations obey international law, 
one must account for the importance of domestic internalization of international norms). 
 139.  Koh, supra note 9. 
 140.  See id. (asserting that government actors have been forced to internalize international 
legal norms). 
 141.  See id. (discussing the fact that actors outside of the federal government internalize 
international legal norms). 
 142.  See id. (including states as actors outside of the federal government that internalize 
international legal norms).  
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these norms.143 And they will want to comply with an international 
norm precisely when they see that the federal government is acting in 
violation of what they consider to be a common-sense way to conduct 
oneself in the world. In our common-sense example, the need to act is 
particularly great when one is in a car with a driver whom one 
discovers to be drunk only after merging (or swerving) onto a busy 
highway; in that scenario, one might go to great lengths to make sure 
that the driver pulls the car over to the side of the highway and gets 
away from the steering wheel. 
Transnational legal process thus inherently creates a potential for 
conflict between the state and federal governments. It creates the 
kinds of incentives for state actors to want to act when, to their minds, 
the federal government is violating basic international norms that 
they have since internalized as basic common sense.144 
Koh’s theory, as well as his call to action, thus conceives of states 
as an active check on federal foreign policy. This theory—and call to 
action—thus sits precisely in the most controversial zone of the 
foreign affairs powers after Garamendi.145 And it sits in a zone that is 
not yet fully theorized in the literature.146 
But it also provides a starting point for resolving this controversy. 
The potential for conflict arises because of state participation in 
global governance networks in which states interact with the 
transnational legal process. Logically, the conflict is but a symptom of 
this participation. Thus, if state participation in global governance 
networks is permissible, the result of this participation by logical 
extension is also presumptively constitutionally permissible. This 
frame thus moves from an analysis of symptoms (conflict between 
state law and federal foreign policy) to causes and can therefore help 
to resolve precisely the questions posed by the literature—and resolve 
them in a manner that is reasonably detached from specific policy 
results, making continued agreement between scholars from different 
ends of the political spectrum more probable and the resulting 
proposal more doctrinally sound in the process. The remainder of the 
 
 143.  See id. (pointing out that many states and their citizens want to comply with the Paris 
Climate Accords).   
 144.  See id. (describing the fact that citizens of states may understand the effects of climate 
change even though the federal government is not complying with the related international 
norms). 
 145.  See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003) (holding that the exercise of 
federal executive authority requires state law to give way when there is conflict).   
 146.  See Section I.C. 
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Article will therefore focus on the question through this reframed 
perspective. 
II. THE REACH OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE NETWORKS “ALL THE 
WAY DOWN” 
A. Transnational Legal Process and Global Governance Networks 
The question presented by Dean Koh’s paradigm shift away from 
classic foreign affairs rubrics towards transnational legal process is 
whether states may constitutionally participate in transnational legal 
processes. This section outlines that states participate in transnational 
legal processes by joining global governance networks. It first 
introduces the concept of global governance networks and then 
explains the relationship between global governance networks and 
transnational legal process. 
1. Global Governance Networks 
Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter has exhaustively theorized how 
global governance networks function.147 Slaughter submits that 
networks exist on a sliding scale from purely informal, ad hoc 
networks at one end to networks formalized through the creation of 
international organizations, setting out their functioning in 
multilateral treaties, on the other.148 Informal networks form when 
regulators (or other key actors in civil society) meet and discuss 
common problems on a reasonably frequent basis—for instance, in 
the setting of international conferences.149 The regulators then have a 
forum to exchange know-how and can then develop stable conduits to 
improve their own respective regulatory responses to shared 
 
 147.  SLAUGHTER, supra note 20, passim; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, America’s Edge: 
Power in the Networked Century, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 94 (2009) (providing a foreign affairs 
perspective); Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law is 
Domestic, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL 
LAW 110, 117 (Janne Nijman & Andre Nollkaemper eds., 2007) (explaining that a “critically 
important tool in strengthening the institutions of national governments is the formalization and 
inclusion of ‘government networks’ as mechanisms of global governance.”); Anne-Marie 
Slaughter & David Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 211, 219 (2006) (discussing the effectiveness of government networks); Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated 
Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041, 1042 (2003) [hereinafter Slaughter, Disaggregated 
Democracy] (discussing the relationship between networks). 
 148.  See SLAUGHTER, supra note 20, at 48–49 (contrasting these two types of networks). 
 149.  Id. at 49. 
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problems.150 Formal networks, on the other hand, require diplomatic 
negotiations involving multiple governmental departments to draft 
and conclude multilateral treaties setting up standing administrative 
bodies to coordinate the trans-boundary regulatory exchanges 
between state members.151 
Global governance networks differ from traditional forms of 
international multilateral lawmaking. Traditional international law 
making relied upon diplomatic conferences.152 States participating in 
diplomatic conferences set out to negotiate ex ante the substance and 
process to be included in a multilateral treaty in a manner akin to 
contractual bargaining.153 States habitually relied upon their own 
batteries of technical and legal experts to inform their diplomatic 
negotiation positions.154 A diplomatic conference was successful if it 
led to the conclusion of a multilateral instrument, the rules of which 
would then apply prospectively, leaving only interpretive questions to 
be resolved during the implementation of the treaty.155 
Global governance networks replace this ex ante pre-commitment 
device of ex ante multilateral treaties with regular engagement 
between technical and legal experts in different jurisdictions sharing a 
common problem. The goal of global governance networks is to 
discuss and coordinate solutions to shared problems.156 To participate 
in the network in good faith, network participants must accept that 
they share a common problem.157 Their discourse is fruitful if they can 
assess the regulatory experience of their peers and engage in critical 
conversations about possible pathways to resolve their common 
problem.158 Their discourse may at some point create the shared need 
 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  See id. at 63–64 (comparing regulators to the diplomats of old).  
 152.  See Timothy Meyer, From Contract to Legislation: The Logic of Modern Lawmaking, 
14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 559, 569 (2014) (contrasting the traditional role of a diplomatic conference to 
bilateral prescriptive approaches). 
 153.  See id. (comparing bilateral investment treaty negotiations to contracts). 
 154.  See Leila Nadya Sadat, Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age, 107 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 334, 352 (2013) (“The Diplomatic Conference rejected appeals from some governments to 
add economic and environmental crimes, preferring the list to include only crimes already found 
in other international instruments or clearly understood to be predicate acts of crimes against 
humanity under customary international law.”). 
 155.  RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 71 (2008). 
 156.  See SLAUGHTER, supra note 20, at 49 (using FINCEN as an example of governments 
coming together to solve a common problem).  
 157.  See id. at 250 (discussing the concept of positive comity).  
 158.  Id. 
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for the conclusion of a more formal agreement.159 Just as probable, 
however, regular informal engagement between participants may very 
well suffice to reap the coordinative benefits of network 
participation.160 
One of the consequences of global governance networks is the 
explosion of governance through parallel tracks.161 Global governance 
networks do not have a central global clearinghouse.162 Nor do global 
governance networks necessarily rely upon domestic coordination.163 
This means that global governance networks can exacerbate or create 
conflicts within states when different administrative departments are 
at odds with one another as to which agency has jurisdiction over a 
certain set of problems. Thus, one might imagine that the energy, 
interior, and environmental ministries of a country could be at odds 
with each other as to who has authority to regulate power plant or oil 
and gas production emissions. There is no guarantee that global 
governance networks would cross these silos—and every chance that 
competing networks could be formed. 
2. The Relationship Between Global Governance Networks and 
Transnational Legal Process 
Global governance networks and transnational legal process 
operate like flip sides of the same coin.164 Transnational legal process 
thrives when there is robust engagement across national boundaries—
and the more multilateral the exchange, the more robust is the 
exchange, interpretation, and internationalization of international 
norms in domestic discourse.165 On the other hand, particularly 
 
 159.  See Sloss, supra note 123, at 524–26 (outlining the formalization of discussions between 
California and Canadian provinces). 
 160.  See SLAUGHTER, supra note 20, at 250 (using the example of antitrust cooperation).  
 161.  See Slaughter, Disaggregated Democracy, supra note 147, at 1042 (noting that 
governance advocates rely upon governance “particularly through multiple parallel networks of 
public and private actors . . . .”). 
 162.  See Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 147, at 219 (“Networks combine central authority 
and decentralized actors, at least when they are constituted, as they increasingly are in the 
European Union, with a central node that functions as a secretariat and clearinghouse.”); 
Stephen Zamora, Rethinking North America: Why NAFTA’s Laissez Faire Approach to 
Integration Is Flawed, and What to Do About It, 56 VILL. L. REV. 631, 669 (2011) (noting that 
some North American network clearinghouses exist but that more would be desirable). 
 163.  See SLAUGHTER, supra note 20, at 49 (giving examples of networks that come about 
even amidst a lack of domestic coordination).  
 164.  See Waters, supra note 20, at 456 (discussing the relationship between global 
governance networks and transnational legal process theory). 
 165.  Compare Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 147, at 117 (noting the importance of 
the growth of governance networks), with Koh TLP, supra note 11, at 194–206 (outlining the 
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informal global governance networks function because the 
engagement in these networks by participants from various 
backgrounds creates the kind of stickiness theorized by transnational 
legal process.166 
The immediate consequence of this relationship is that global 
governance networks create conduits for norm internalization. Global 
governance networks internalize the problem solutions adopted by 
other network participants as their own and self-impose limitations 
upon their own choices.167 These solutions therefore become sticky 
because of the underlying path dependence created by the continued 
engagement by network participants with each other and their shared 
interpretation of internalized norms.168 
The central feature of stickiness through networked norm 
internalization is reliance.169 Network participants act in reliance upon 
the continued coordinative efforts by other participants.170 Global 
governance network are premised upon the assumption that 
networked coordination creates shared benefits for all participants.171 
Shared benefits depend upon the honest and reasonable contribution 
to the network by all participants. One participant’s failure to 
contribute can create windfalls for that member from the efforts of its 
peers. When this windfall imposes disproportionate burdens on the 
remaining participants, serious disincentives of further participation in 
the network arise.172 In the worst case, networks will fall apart and the 
 
functioning of transnational legal process along similar lines). 
 166.  Harold H. Koh, The Trump Administration and International Law, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 
413, 446 (2017) (“What all of this again reminds us is that deals are sticky and global governance 
regimes are path-dependent. As these regimes develop, they take on a life of their own—
building consensus about what set of norms, rules, principles, and decision-making procedures 
should apply in a particular issue area. Intricate patterns of layered public and private 
cooperation develop, and formal lawmaking and institutions eventually emerge. These patterns 
create stiff paths of least resistance from which new political leaders can deviate only at 
considerable cost.”). 
 167.  See Koh TLP, supra note 11, at 194–206 (using examples of when nations have obeyed 
international law to show the internalization of norms). 
 168.  See Koh, supra note 166, at 446 (using the Iran Deal to show that deals are sticky and 
global governance regimes are path-dependent).  
 169.  See Frederic G. Sourgens, Climate Commons Law, 50 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 885, 
934–44 (arguing that the United States has certain legal obligations because of other countries’ 
reliance on its commitments); Frederic G. Sourgens, Supernational Law, 50 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 155, 184–95 (2017) (explaining that unilateral acts protect reliance interests). 
 170.  See SLAUGHTER, supra note 20147, at 250 (discussing positive comity). 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and their Limits, 34 
YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 125–26 (2009) (comparing the risk of opportunistic defection in the 
regulatory context to the Prisoner’s Dilemma). 
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benefit of coordination will be lost.173 Transnational legal process 
describes the process that counteracts this potential for decay. 
B. State Participation in Global Governance Networks 
In light of the discussion so far, Koh’s statement that “norm 
internalization goes all the way down”174 suggests that state officials 
participate in global governance networks. More accurately, the 
interactions permitted by global governance networks will 
exponentially increase the opportunity for engagement and 
interpretation of international norms by state actors.175 The statement 
that norm internalization goes all the way down is practically more 
meaningful to the extent that it could be established that state 
officials in fact participate on a regular basis in global governance 
networks. 
State officials do in fact participate in a host of global governance 
networks.176 These networks typically form in the same manner that 
they do on the national level. They rely upon an exchange between 
different subject matter regulators sharing in joint problems.177 
It is on the whole uncontroversial that state regulators participate 
in informal networks. Many of these networks form as part of 
conferences or panel discussions. To give one recent example of such 
an exchange, a 2016 panel discussion in Houston brought together the 
oil and gas regulators of the State of Texas with their foreign 
counterparts from Mexico and Brazil.178 Learned societies frequently 
form one umbrella in which such exchanges can be further cultivated 
through panel discussions and informally after sessions are 
concluded.179 
 
 173.  See id. (arguing that in light of disincentives, cooperation will break down).  
 174.  Koh, supra note 9. 
 175.  See Koh, supra note 135, at 2618 (“Through [an] interactive process, . . . law helps 
translate claims of legal authority into national behavior.”). 
 176.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 277–89. 
 177.  See id. at 280 (“virtually all of them have the same limited function – coordinating 
activities by Border States in sharing information, resources or costs within a transboundary 
region”) (quoting Duncan Hollis, The Elusive Foreign Compact, 73 MO. L. REV. 1071, 1076 
(2008)).  
 178.  See The Inter-American Hydrocarbon Regulators Dialogue, U. HOUS. (Oct. 7, 2016), 
http://law.uh.edu/eenrcenter/Inter-American/Conference.asp. 
 179.  See The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors, AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. 38 (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/annualmeeting/pdfs/AM_Program.pdf (last visited Mar. 
11, 2019) (bringing together Australian, Brazilian, Danish and UK officials to exchange on the 
legality of use of force against non-state actors). 
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State regulators further serve in formal global governance 
networks. One such example is the U.S.-Canada Transportation 
Border Working Group (TBWG). The TBWG is tasked with 
facilitating “the safe, secure, efficient, and environmentally 
responsible movement of people and goods across the Canada-U.S. 
border.”180 The TBWG is a formal network created by an October 13, 
2000, Memorandum of Cooperation between the U.S. and Canadian 
governments.181 The TBWG importantly includes not just federal 
officials from the respective governments of the U.S. and Canada but 
also state and provincial representatives from affected states and 
provinces such as Michigan and Ontario.182 
The current conflict between the federal government and U.S. 
states with regard to climate change suggests that states are willing to 
take a more active part in more formal global governance networks 
traditionally reserved to the national federal government.183 The first 
meeting of the parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) following the statement of U.S. intent to 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement is a case in point.184 The Paris 
Agreement is a treaty concluded under the auspices of the 
UNFCCC.185 The intended withdrawal from the Paris Agreement by 
the U.S. thus created friction for the U.S. for purposes of the 
Conference of the Parties meeting convened in Bonn following the 
announced withdrawal.186 
In part in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement, U.S. states sent delegations to the conference of the 
parties meeting in Bonn.187 These delegations were larger than the 
U.S. delegation—and far more vocal and supportive of the underlying 
 
 180.  TBWG, http://www.thetbwg.org/index_e.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 181.  Memorandum of Cooperation, TBWG (Oct. 13, 2000), http://www.thetbwg.org/about-
memorandum_e.htm. 
 182.  See TBWG Directory, http://www.thetbwg.org/about-directory_e.htm (last visited Mar. 
11, 2019). 
 183.  See Sloss, supra note 123, at 521–22 (discussing the increasing willingness of U.S. states 
to form foreign state agreements in recent years in light of the Supreme Court’s Compact 
Clause doctrine). 
 184.  See Sourgens, Climate Commons Law, supra note 169, at 937 (discussing the “shadow 
delegation” sent by U.S. states and municipalities following the Trump Administration’s 
announced withdrawal from the Paris Agreement). 
 185.  Id. at 901–02. 
 186.  Id. at 936–37 (describing the protests by France, Germany, Italy, and China in 
response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement).  
 187.  Id. at 937. 
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goals of the Paris Agreement.188 In fact, these delegations sought to 
assure official delegates of continued commitment by large U.S. states 
to the U.S. climate change mitigation goals expressed in the nationally 
determined commitment.189 
The reception of the state delegations evinces the fluid and 
flexible nature of global governance networks. The state delegations 
could not participate in the formal sessions reserved for official 
national delegations.190 But the state delegations did engage in 
exchanges with their foreign national on the back of the official 
schedule.191 These delegations thus used official formal networks to 
create an informal network in their shadows—and to communicate a 
policy position that directly contradicted the position taken by their 
national government in official, formal proceedings.192 
In short, Koh’s observation that internalization goes all the way 
down correctly identifies that state officials are active participants in 
global governance networks.193 These networks tend to be more 
informal than the formal networks created by multilateral treaties. 
These networks nevertheless present the same opportunities for 
exchange. Consequently, states have meaningful opportunities to 
engage, interpret, and internalize international norms as a matter of 
state law and state regulation. They further have meaningful 
opportunities to do so in defiance of, and resistance to, federal, 
national positions. 
C. Resistance and Friction Between Global Governance Networks 
The global governance network perspective speaks directly to the 
issue under-theorized by the foreign affairs literature: the potential 
for friction between state law and federal foreign policy, or resistance 
by state law to federal foreign policy. As a matter of current affairs, 
 
 188.  See id. (citing Lisa Friedman, A Shadow Delegation Stalks the Official U.S. Team at 
Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/climate/un-
climate-talks-bonn.html). 
 189.  See id. 
 190.  See id. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  See Koh TLP, supra note 12, at 206 (“[N]ations will come into compliance with 
international norms if transnational legal processes are aggressively triggered by other 
transnational actors in a way that forces interaction in forums capable of generating norms, 
followed by norm-internalization. This process of interaction and internalization in turn leads a 
national government to engage in new modes of interest-recognition and identity-formation in a 
way that eventually leads the nation-state back into compliance.”). 
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the ongoing conflict between states like California and other like-
minded states on the one hand, and the Trump administration on the 
other hand, highlights that global governance networks create the 
potential for friction between a national government and state 
governments.194 This conflict potential so far appears to be reasonably 
binary: it could be cast as resistance by state actors (the delegations 
from California and other states) against the attempts at defection of 
a national actor (the Trump administration) from a global governance 
network (the Paris Agreement).195 
Such a binary view would, however, be overly simplistic because it 
fails to capture that global governance networks create significant 
friction due to resistance between networks beyond just the simple 
defection scenario. The fact that states form part of global governance 
networks therefore has significantly more far reaching consequences 
than the Californian conflict with the Trump administration might at 
first suggest. 
The global-governance-network perspective thus permits one to 
put a finer point on this phenomenon. The foreign affairs literature so 
far has struggled with theorizing how conflicts between state laws and 
federal foreign policy should be approached.196 The global governance 
network perspective permits several conclusions that will aid in 
gaining a better understanding of these conflicts. 
First, the transnational legal process inherently and necessarily 
creates friction across global governance networks. The transnational 
legal process of norm internalization is situation dependent: 
interpretation and internalization of norms is context-specific to the 
situation in which a global norm was encountered (that is, the 
“interaction” triggering it).197 Global governance networks, in turn, 
define the parameters in which network participants encounter and 
interpret norms.198 This means that the multiplicity of networks 
 
 194.  See Oliver Milman, Paris Deal: A Year After Trump Announced US Exit, a Coalition 
Fights to Fill the Gap, THE GUARDIAN (June 1, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/may/31/paris-climate-deal-trump-exit-resistance (describing the tensions between the 
Trump Administration and resistant state governments and business leaders in light of the 
Administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement). 
 195.  See id. 
 196.  See supra section I.C. 
 197.  See Harold H. Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture - Transnational Legal Process After 
September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 337, 339 (2004) (“Those seeking to embed certain 
norms into national conduct seek to trigger interactions that yield legal interpretations that are 
then internalized into the domestic law of even resistant nation states.”). 
 198.  See Slaughter, Disaggregated Democracy, supra note 147, at 1042 (noting the existence 
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invariably leads to a certain amount of substantive norm 
fragmentation or divergence between different networks.199 Each 
network interprets norms in light of their own specific problem-
horizon or context.200 Consequently, each network (and a participant 
within each network) internalizes these norms in a manner that is 
highly context dependent. As context does not duplicate between 
networks, divergence—friction—is pre-programmed.201 
Second, with friction pre-programmed, the dynamics of global 
governance network sustainability also lay the seeds for latent 
conflicts between networks. The continued functioning of a specific 
network depends upon the continued adherence of network 
participants to shared norm interpretations.202 As the network 
depends for its sustainability on this shared norm internalization, it 
will naturally resist the external imposition of a rival norm.203 It will 
do so irrespective of whether the rival norm is the result of nationalist, 
mercantilist, or nativist jingoism or the result of a norm that is the 
 
of parallel networks); Slaughter, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 20, at 49 (noting the 
function of ad hoc networks). 
 199.  See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political 
Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007) (arguing 
that the fragmentation of international law reflects a dangerous, nonegalitarian system 
undermining the integrity of international law); Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther 
Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global 
Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004) (rejecting that epistemic communities in international law 
could be governed by a market place of ideas); Stephan, supra note 22, at 1578–79 
(“Privatization that destabilizes the domain of international law by making it less clear where 
international rules apply thus produces high costs that require exceptional justification.”). 
 200.  See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 317 (Joel Weinsheimer & 
Donald G. Marshall trans., Bloomsbury Pub. 2004) (discussing the fusion of horizons).  
 201.  I am indebted with regard to this insight to Craig Martin, who formulated a similar 
point as a critique to transnational legal process theory in the context of the jus ad bellum 
discourse. See Craig Martin, Symposium: The Assumptions of Koh’s Transnational Legal 
Process as Counter-Strategy, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 26, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/02/26/ 
symposium-the-assumptions-of-kohs-transnational-legal-process-as-counter-strategy/ (“But 
such interpretation and internalization will only result in compliance with international law if 
the interpretation itself is at least within a range of reasonable interpretations consistent with 
established principles of international law. If the interpretation is outside of such reasonable 
range, and moreover if it is a deliberate and instrumental effort to cloak or rationalize a 
departure from international law, then it is difficult to see how the process will result in 
compliance.”). 
 202.  See Nathan Gibbs, Human Rights, Symbolic Form, and the Idea of the Global 
Constitution, 18 GERMAN L. J. 511, 526–27 (2017) (discussing the nature of self-referential 
discourses in transnational law). 
 203.  See Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? 
Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 566 (2002) (highlighting the tensions between 
jurisprudential approaches taken by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice). 
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result of a rival interpretation and internalization from a competing 
global governance network. Short of combining networks to 
coordinate norm interpretations, in other words, resistance between 
networks is just as probable to occur as conflicts with nationalist 
“network deniers.”204 
Transnational legal process and global governance networks thus 
provide a means through which norm conflicts through the resistance 
between networks continue to propagate. This is not necessarily a 
negative. Rather, it reflects that value demands in any political sphere, 
including the global sphere, are necessarily plural and, as such, 
necessarily in some degree of competition with each other.205 
The value added by switching from a traditional foreign affairs 
perspective to a networked transnational legal process perspective 
should by now be readily apparent. What appeared as a purely 
political question in the foreign affairs literature—conflicts between 
state legislators and the federal government—is now legally 
cognizable.206 Transnational legal process and global governance 
networks are legal phenomena subject to legal analysis. Placing 
conflict between state law and federal foreign policy in this new rubric 
of friction between governance networks thus permits a more 
nuanced jurisprudential understanding of why and how processes 
already theorized in legal scholarship result in conflicts that 
previously had been considered to reside exclusively in the political 
realm. 
D. States of Resistance: The Topography of State-National Network 
Conflicts 
The switch to a global governance network/transnational legal 
perspective allows a more nuanced view as to why and how different 
kinds of conflicts between state law and federal foreign policy can 
arise by focusing on the differing states of resistance between state 
and federal network participants. As this section will show, not all of 
this resistance is created equal. Rather, the dynamics of transnational 
legal processes channel this resistance or friction along predictable—
 
 204.  See Stephan, supra note 22, at 1650 (outlining the danger of such competition for the 
“preserv[ation of] clear and stable domain rules.”). 
 205.  See Frederic G. Sourgens, Functions of Freedom: Privacy, Autonomy, Dignity, and the 
Transnational Legal Process, 48 VAND., 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 471, 497–500 (2015) 
(outlining the value of pluralist conceptions of transnational law in a process frame). 
 206.  See Section I.C. 
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and more readily ascertainable—pathways that can then be subject to 
more nuanced legal analysis in their own right. To fully understand 
the potential for resistance and friction inherent in treating states as 
fully-fledged actors in global governance networks, it is therefore 
necessary to map how conflicts could arise. This section proposes such 
a topography of five potential states of resistance between state and 
federal government actors consisting of conflict as: (1) a state check 
on federal defection, (2) the use of states as allies in an ongoing clash 
between multiple networks to which the federal government 
contributes, (3) state assertions of interests through their own 
autonomous networks in which the federal government does not take 
part, (4) state defection from federal networks, and (5) differences in 
amplitude of state and federal commitments to goals articulated in 
shared networks.207 
1. Check on Defection 
The first, and most severe, friction between states and the federal 
government arises in the context of the defection by either state or 
federal participants in a network and the resistance to this defection 
by the respective other actor. A complete defection occurs when the 
federal government is a network participant in an existing network 
and seeks to leave the network in question. This is typically the case in 
the context of a change in administration following a presidential 
election. The defection by the Trump administration from the Paris 
Agreement is an example of such an effective defection from a global 
network.208 
The state government can act as a check on defection, that is, resist 
it, by seeking to step into the shoes of the defecting federal 
government. It would then seek to use its own legislative and 
regulatory powers in order to meet network expectations. It would do 
so in the face of contrary deregulatory moves by the federal 
government.209 
The state government in this scenario will also seek to continue 
the engagement with other network participants. It will do so by 
 
 207.  HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE 
SOCIETY 33 (1992) (discussing the importance of drawing up a “comprehensive map of 
demanded values and of institutional practices by which values are shaped and shared”). 
 208.  For a discussion of this defection, see Sourgens, Climate Commons Law, supra note 
169. 
 209.  See Popovich, supra note 2. 
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seeking out opportunities for continued, typically informal exchanges 
with other network participants.210 This effort can lead to 
strengthened internalization of shared network norms in excess of 
earlier federal commitments over time.211 In other words, the states 
would continue to participate in the network in earnest rather than 
simply maintaining a status quo. This continued engagement is 
inherent in network participation and the continued engagement such 
participation entails with fellow regulators. This engagement will lead 
to new interpretations and internalization of norms that will then be 
applied by states in their own regulatory processes. 
The longer a defection conflict is allowed to persist, the more 
pronounced the friction created by state resistance will become. For 
instance, state governments in this case will continue progressively to 
develop and apply international norms.212 The federal government, on 
the other hand, sought to defect from these norms at an earlier stage 
of development—and of ambition.213 This friction, therefore, can have 
drastic consequences. 
2. States as Allies in Friction between National Networks 
A different state of resistance arises when state governments take 
sides in ongoing friction between two or more networks in which 
national governmental actors participate. In this scenario, state actors 
will share in the same norm interpretations and norm internalizations 
with some national actors but resist the rival norm internalizations of 
other networks in which national actors also participate. 
To the extent that a different global governance network conflicts 
with the network in which state and national actors cooperate with 
each other, the state regulators will become natural allies for the 
affected national regulators. State regulation would shore up the 
position of the national regulator and provide further cooperation 
 
 210.  See Erik Kirschbaum, California Gov. Jerry Brown Delivers a Blunt Climate Change 
Message in Germany, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-
germany-jerry-brown-climate-change-20171108-story.html (reporting on the California 
governor’s tour to continue climate change mitigation efforts). 
 211.  See Jean Chemnick, Cities and States Are Picking Up Trump’s Slack on Climate, SCI. 
AM. (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/cities-and-states-are-picking-
up-trumps-slack-on-climate/ (a group of states “unveiled research Wednesday showing that 
participants in the alliance are on track to meet or exceed their share of the Obama-era 
nationally determined contribution to Paris, which called for a 26 to 28 percent cut in emissions 
by 2025 compared with 2005 levels.”). 
 212.  See id. 
 213.  See id. 
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across national-state divides. State legislators or regulators in this 
context would contribute to an ongoing battle for competence 
between different federal/ national agencies by resisting against the 
proposed norm internalizations from the rival national network with 
the promulgation of state laws or regulations. 
Massachusetts’s so-called “Burma law” on closer inspection is one 
such example that gained notoriety in the foreign affairs literature. 
Massachusetts in 1996 passed a law boycotting companies doing 
business in Burma, citing human rights concerns.214 The law was the 
result of an informal participation by Massachusetts lawmakers in a 
loose, broad human rights network.215 As one commentator noted, as 
of June 2000, “twenty-four municipal, county, or state governments 
had enacted selective purchasing laws specifically targeting Burma.”216 
The actions by Massachusetts pitted human rights concerns—and 
human rights networks—against free trade concerns and free trade 
networks.217 Free trade advocates were quick to assert that the 
measure was inconsistent with U.S. commitments made before the 
World Trade Organization.218 By passing its “Burma law,” 
Massachusetts, and other states and municipalities, became the 
champion of human rights networks—and an opponent of champions 
from free trade networks. 
The U.S. Supreme Court eventually struck down the 
Massachusetts law as standing as obstacle to national foreign policy.219 
By the time the measure reached the Supreme Court, Congress had 
passed its own law relating to sanctions on Burma.220 The Supreme 
Court reasoned that the Massachusetts law encroached upon 
discretion granted to the President under the federal statute because 
the Massachusetts law stood as an obstacle to the execution of federal 
 
 214.  Peter L. Fitzgerald, Massachusetts, Burma, and the World Trade Organization: A 
Commentary on Blacklisting, Federalism, and Internet Advocacy in the Global Trading Era, 34 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (2001). 
 215.  Id. (describing a meeting between Massachusetts Representative Byron Rushing and 
Simon Billeness, a key figure in the Free Burma Coalition, wherein the two discussed anti-
apartheid legislation).   
 216.  Id. at 7. 
 217.  See id. at 53. 
 218.  Id. at 13. 
 219.  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
 220.  Id. at 368 (“[T]hree months after the Massachusetts law was enacted, Congress passed 
a statute imposing a set of mandatory and conditional sanctions on Burma.”). 
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Congressional intent.221 The Supreme Court thus took sides in the 
conflict between federal and state action.222 
Importantly, however, the resistance created by the Massachusetts 
law and others like it was instrumental in bringing about a federal 
program imposing different sanctions on Burma for its human rights 
abuses. As Glennon and Sloane point out, “local actors at the state 
and municipal levels took the initiative to advance values (e.g., 
political reform in Burma, international human rights protection) that 
might otherwise have been marginalized.”223 Although the 
Massachusetts Burma law facially failed (it was struck down by the 
Supreme Court), its enactment had a lasting policy impact by 
providing human rights advocates at the U.S. federal level with the 
needed political urgency to adopt a federal program.224 In other words, 
the insertion of Massachusetts into the friction between trade and 
human rights networks—both networks to which the United States 
belongs—created additional resistance against free trade norm 
internalizations that materially moved the direction of U.S. foreign 
policy towards the human rights network. 
3. States as Source of New Network Conflicts 
Friction can also arise when states enter into global governance 
networks from which the national government is absent. Such 
networks can form when one or several states confront regulatory 
problems that are inherent in a particular environment. The overall 
policy problems faced by the state government may very look 
different from the policy concerns of the federal government and thus 
lead to the creation of competing global governance networks. 
One example of such a potential policy conflict is the Arctic. The 
Arctic is subject to a national multilateral treaty to which the U.S. is a 
party, the Arctic Council.225 At the same time, Alaska has established a 
state-based commission to deal with Arctic problems, the Alaska 
Arctic Policy Commission.226 One of the policy goals of the Alaska 
Arctic Policy Commission is to “[s]trengthen and expand cross-border 
 
 221.  Id. at 373, 385. 
 222.  Cf. id. 
 223.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 299. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  For a discussion of the formation of the Arctic Council, see Evan T. Bloom, 
Establishment of the Arctic Council, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 712 (1999). 
 226.  Final Report and Implementation Plan, Alaska Arctic Policy Commission (Jan. 30, 
2015), http://www.akarctic.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/AAPC_Exec_Summary_lowres.pdf. 
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relationships and international cooperation, especially bilateral 
engagements with Canada and Russia.”227 This goal is separate and 
apart from efforts to “[s]ustain and enhance state participation in the 
Arctic Council.”228 
The Alaska Arctic Policy Commission has already made 
statements that, on their face, would appear to enter into traditional 
areas of foreign policy and are inconsistent with federal policy at this 
point. Thus, for reasons to do with rights to the Arctic codified in the 
United Convention on the Law of the Sea—a treaty the United States 
Senate steadfastly refuses to ratify—the Commission “[r]eiterate[d] 
the state’s long-time support for ratification of the Law of the Sea 
Treaty.”229 
The entry into global governance networks by states, through 
which states deal directly with their foreign counterparts to address 
predominantly local problems, can lead to an internalization of 
different norms from the ones internalized at the national level. This 
can lead to norm conflicts particularly when the norms at issue at the 
local level concern environmental regulations or matters pertaining to 
cultural rights of local indigenous peoples. 
4. States as a Drag on Creations of New National Networks 
At the same time, friction can also arise when the federal 
government enters into new global governance networks without the 
states on issues that have strong implications for traditional state 
regulation. In such instances, the new national or federal networks 
will produce results that may well be at odds with the policy of state 
governments—and with established global governance networks of 
which the states form part. 
In such instances, states may very well resist the full enforcement 
of a global understanding. One example of this situation is the 
enforcement of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.230 As 
one scholar noted, “[t]he U.S. government considers consular 
notification requirements to be extremely important.”231 The Vienna 
 
 227.  Id. at 10. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 231.  Anthony N. Bishop, The Unenforceable Rights to Consular Notification and Access in 
the United States: What’s Changed Since the Lagrand Case?, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (2002). 
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Convention in fact ultimately included a right to consular notification 
and access in its Article 36.232 The United States actively continued to 
remain involved in transnational legal processes relating to consular 
notification obligations.233 
Meanwhile, U.S. state law enforcement officers did not abide by 
the consular notification requirements established in the Convention 
and thus resisted its intended implementation.234 Paraguay, Germany, 
and Mexico each brought claims against the United States under the 
Vienna Convention before ICJ in cases in which Panamanian, 
German, and Mexican nationals, respectively, were not informed of 
their consular rights and subsequently sentenced to death in capital 
murder cases.235 The ICJ found the United States liable and ordered 
that executions not be carried out. The United States sought to 
comply with the order.236 This result is consistent with the overall 
international legal framework and global governance networks as 
they were internalized at the U.S. State Department.237 
Texas, in particular, resisted the attempt to have the order 
enforced and pursued litigation on the issue to the United States 
Supreme Court.238 Texas successfully argued before the Supreme 
Court that the treaty pursuant to which the ICJ judgment was 
rendered was not self-executing and that it consequently did not 
benefit from the Supremacy Clause’s displacement of inconsistent 
state law. The state in that particular instance successfully resisted the 
imposition of new obligations through international legal processes—
somewhat to the chagrin of the U.S. State Department.239 
 
 232.  See Vienna Convention, supra note 230, at art. 36. 
 233.  Roberto Iraola, Federal Criminal Prosecutions and the Right to Consular Notification 
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 179, 184–88 (2002) (discussing 
internal state department and justice department interpretations of Article 36). 
 234.  For a discussion of state law treatment of the consular notification right in Article 36 of 
the Vienna Convention, see Alberto R. Gonzales & Amy L. Moore, No Right At All: Putting 
Consular Notification in its Rightful Place After Medellin, 66 FLA. L. REV. 685, 712–15 (2014). 
 235.  Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, 19–20 
(Mar. 31); LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 446, 477–78 (June 27); Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Provisional Measure, 1998 I.C.J. 248, 249 (Apr. 9).  
 236.  See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Provisional Measure, 
1998 I.C.J. 248, 256 ¶ 29 (Apr. 9). 
 237.  See Iraola, supra note 233, at 184–88 (discussing internal state department and justice 
department interpretations of Article 36). 
 238.  Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 239.  See id. at 514–15; see also Janet Koven Levit, Does Medellin Matter?, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 617, 617 (2008). 
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5. Potential Amplitude Conflicts within Shared Networks 
The most common friction can arise when certain states disagree 
with the level of federal commitment with regard to a global 
governance issue that specifically affects the states in question. 
California again provides a good example. As Professor Daniel A. 
Farber notes, “the expansion of environmental law beyond the 
traditional borders of federal environmental regulation is already well 
underway in California.”240 As he explains, the California initiative can 
be traced back to 2006 when Governor Schwarzenegger “signed into 
law the capstone of the State’s climate policy, the California Global 
Warming Solutions Act of 2006.”241 This California initiative was 
firmly embedded in global governance networks: 
This law generated world-wide attention, including a statement by 
the British Prime Minister that its signing represented a “historic 
day for the rest of the world as well.” The Prime Minister and the 
Governor of California also entered into an agreement to share 
best practices on market-based systems and to cooperate to 
investigate new technologies; similar agreements now exist 
between California and states and provinces in Australia and 
Canada.242 
Action by California in 2006 does not represent a reaction to a 
defection by the federal government from global climate networks. 
The Bush administration continued to participate—anemically—in 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
proceedings.243 Although California’s action stands against the 
backdrop of a U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, this 
withdrawal was telegraphed unanimously by the U.S. Senate during 
the Kyoto negotiations on the basis of distinct policy disagreements 
on the importance of developing country participation in climate 
change mitigation measures.244 In other words, California wished to do 
 
 240.  Daniel A. Farber, California Climate Law—Model or Object Lesson?, 32 PACE ENVTL. 
L. REV. 492, 497 (2015). 
 241.  Id. at 493. 
 242.  Id. at 493–94. 
 243.  See Cinnamon Carlarne, Notes from A Climate Change Pressure-Cooker: Sub-Federal 
Attempts at Transformation Meet National Resistance in the USA, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1351, 1361 
(2008) (“President Bush’s climate change plan is based on reducing greenhouse gas ‘intensity,’ 
which measures the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to economic output. The initiative calls 
for an 18 percent reduction in greenhouse gas intensity by 2012. Nowhere does the plan commit 
to, or support, absolute reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.”). 
 244.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 38 ENVTL. L. 
REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10566, 10568 (2008) (citing the U.S. Senate’s unanimous adoption of a 
resolution asking President Clinton not to agree to limits on greenhouse gas emissions if such 
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more than the federal government on combatting climate change. It 
did not wish to do the opposite. 
In such scenarios, it is possible that the federal government would 
permit states to act more aggressively than the national government 
to meet policy goals through global governance networks.245 Thus, a 
policy may fail for political reasons at the national level but, rather 
than act to preempt state action, the federal government could leave 
some implementation to the states. 
It is similarly possible, however, that the federal government 
would affirmatively seek to set a ceiling on the implementation of 
global governance network goals.246 This may be the case because the 
federal government is seeking to develop leverage for a broader 
resolution of a larger set of problems, or it may be the case due to the 
political commitment by the federal government to the global 
governance network goals.247 But, in either case, the situation is 
fundamentally different from an outright federal network defection as 
the federal government would still, in theory, advance a good faith 
position within the network with which the state government would 
disagree. 
E. Conclusion 
The current conflict between California and the Trump 
administration with regard to climate change mitigation efforts clearly 
fits within the first category of states of resistance brought about by 
state participation in global governance networks.248 California wishes 
to safeguard U.S. participation in the Paris Agreement whereas the 
Trump administration has both indicated its desire to defect from the 
Paris framework and has taken steps to undo most if not all all those 
policy initiatives that underpinned U.S. Paris participation.249 The 
analysis of the current situation might very well fall prey to a variation 
on the old adage that hard cases make bad law—seemingly easy cases 
 
agreements would be detrimental to U.S. economic interests). 
 245.  See Carlarne, supra note 243, at 1380 (discussing the importance of networked 
coordination by states). 
 246.  See id. at 1388–90 (discussing the resistance by the Bush administration to California 
initiatives and the national political deadlock in which it took place). 
 247.  See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 298–99 (discussing obstacle preemption).  
 248.  See, e.g., Chemnick, supra note 211 (explaining the tensions between state leaders and 
the Trump Administration and attributing to former California governor Jerry Brown the idea 
“that the United States’ authority to make emissions reductions is decentralized, and 
subnational actors will do much of the heavy lifting to achieve their country’s Paris targets”). 
 249.  See id. 
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can make bad law, too.250 On its face, President Trump’s defection 
from existing U.S. international climate commitments exhibits the 
kind of “intuitively sensed obviousness” of executive wrongdoing that 
might well “induce[] a rush to judgment.”251 It would therefore be 
easy to follow one’s gut and accept a legally convenient rationale for a 
politically desirable result, thus supporting California’s action because 
of a fundamental disagreement with the style and substance of the 
Trump administration’s foreign and energy policies. This, however, 
would simply propagate the problem already identified at the end of 
the previous section: where one stands on issues of foreign affairs 
powers appears to depend upon where one sits politically on any 
given question. 
The rubrics of states of resistances luckily have provided a far 
richer theoretical toolkit with which to appraise this question. They 
have made it possible to abstract from the particulars of a specific 
dispute and identify core features of legal process that generate 
conflicts between state law and federal foreign policy. This more 
nuanced understanding of what previously were “political questions,” 
in the colloquial if not in the legal sense, thus allows one to more fully 
grasp “the internal coherence or future ramifications” of any one 
approach to resolving the constitutional conflict between states and 
the federal government.252 
The rubric is also far more useful beyond the narrow 
circumstances of today’s current affairs. Conflicts like the one 
presented by the Trump administration have been reasonably rare. On 
the other hand, conflicts that arise out of regime clash or 
fragmentation of global governance networks, such as the clash of free 
trade and human rights networks, or in the context of different 
amplitudes of reaction within the same network, such as the clash 
between California and the federal government on climate change 
policy in the George W. Bush presidency, will become increasingly 
more commonplace in light of the realities of globalization.253 Both 
the arguments that states should be allowed to act as a check or 
balance on federal foreign policy and the manner in which states 
would do so look markedly different in this context. 
 
 250.  O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 804 (1980) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  See Section III. 
SOURGENS_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2019  9:18 PM 
136 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 14 
III. THE STATES’ CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO PARTICIPATE IN 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE NETWORKS 
The Article so far showcases the difficulty for the foreign affairs 
law literature to define precisely when federal foreign policy can 
preempt state law. It reframes this problem through the lens of the 
transnational legal process global governance network literature. It 
shows how participation by states in these processes naturally leads to 
the kind of policy conflicts that create problems for the foreign affairs 
law literature, and it draws a more detailed map of potential types of 
conflict between state law and federal policy than was previously 
possible. But this still does not answer the broader question: Does this 
switch in frame also permit more granular conclusions about the 
constitutionality of such state action? 
A. The Constitutional License to Network 
1. The Compact Clause and Global Governance Networks 
The foreign affairs literature provides an important starting point 
for analyzing the constitutionality of state participation in global 
governance networks. The literature so far has focused on the 
instruments setting up global governance networks in which states 
participate.254 These instruments typically provide for how state actors 
will interact with one other, exchange information, etc.255 Global 
governance networks form when states can interact with foreign 
entities regularly, making this literature directly relevant to the 
current inquiry.256 
The starting point identified by the literature is the Compact 
Clause.257 Thus, the Constitution narrowly prohibits the states from 
 
 254.  See, e.g., Sloss, supra note 123, at 524–26 (discussing California’s climate action in 
concert with Canadian provinces in the context of the Compact Clause); GLENNON & SLOANE, 
supra note 16, at 277–91 (engaging frameworks for state-based cooperation through the lens of 
the Compact Clause); Duncan B. Hollis, The Elusive Foreign Compact, 73 MO. L. REV. 1071, 
1076 (2008) (outlining existing state practice under the Compact Clause). 
 255.  See, e.g., Sloss, supra note 123, at 524–26 (discussing California’s climate action in 
concert with Canadian provinces in the context of the Compact Clause); Duncan B. Hollis, The 
Elusive Foreign Compact, 73 MO. L. REV. 1071, 1076 (2008) (outlining existing state practice 
under the Compact Clause).  
 256.  SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 20, at 49.  
 257.  See, e.g., Sloss, supra note 123, at 524–26 (discussing California’s climate action in 
concert with Canadian provinces in the context of the Compact Clause); GLENNON & SLOANE, 
supra note 16, at 277–91 (engaging frameworks for state-based cooperation through the lens of 
the compact clause); Duncan B. Hollis, The Elusive Foreign Compact, 73 MO. L. REV. 1071, 
1076 (2008) (outlining existing state practice under the Compact Clause).  
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entering into treaties, alliances or confederations with a foreign 
state.258 Further, the Constitution also prohibits the states from 
entering into “any Agreement or Compact” with a foreign power 
without Congressional approval.259 To the extent that the literature 
has discussed the relevant constitutional provisions on the 
permissibility of participation in global governance networks, it has 
done so in the context of this second provision. 
In light of these prohibitions, the key constitutional question is 
whether global governance networks function like “any Agreement or 
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power,” for which 
states would require “the Consent of Congress.”260 Article I, section 10 
of the Constitution distinguishes between “Agreement or Compact” 
by context from “any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation,” into which 
states categorically may not enter by a separate prohibition.261 The 
“Agreement or Compact” thus by context is something short of a 
treaty, and therefore may be sufficiently broad to cover not just the 
agreements setting up global governance networks, but also the 
interaction taking part within them. 
The early leading Supreme Court interpretation of the Compact 
Clause confirms this broad interpretation of “Agreement of 
Compact.” In Holmes v. Jennison,262 the Court interpreted the term 
“Agreement” in the Compact Clause in the “broadest and most 
comprehensive terms” to cover express and implied agreements. The 
Holmes Court encountered the issue in the context of a habeas corpus 
motion made by George Holmes, a man wanted for murder in 
Quebec, who faced extradition to Canada pursuant to an informal 
agreement between the governor of Vermont and a British Canadian 
official.263 The United States Supreme Court in a plurality opinion 
struck down even such an informal agreement as violating the 
Compact Clause.264 It reasoned that an express formal agreement to 
extradite persons in Mr. Holmes position between the State of 
Vermont and British Canada would have been unconstitutional.265 
 
 258.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 259.  Id. at cl. 3. 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  Id. at cl. 1–3. 
 262.  39 U.S. 540, 572 (1840). 
 263.  Id. at 541. 
 264.  Id. at 579. 
 265.  Id. at 572. 
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Consequently, achieving the same result through informal agreement 
should suffer the same fate. Thus, the plurality concluded: 
[I]t was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to use the 
broadest and most comprehensive terms; and that they anxiously 
desired to cut off all connection or communication between a state 
and a foreign power: and we shall fail to execute that evident 
intention, unless we give to the word “agreement” its most 
extended signification; and so apply it as to prohibit every 
agreement, written or verbal, formal or informal, positive or 
implied, by the mutual understanding of the parties.266 
This on its face would apply to global governance networks. 
Specifically, it would address formal agreements setting up these 
networks. But it would also cover more: it would place informal, ad 
hoc networks potentially within the scope of the Compact Clause. 
And it would place interactions in the network within the scope of the 
Compact Clause as well. 
Problematically, as one commentator put it, “[o]ver time, this 
passage was variously cited with approval, viewed as overruled, and 
distinguished on the fact that the agreement at issue concerned 
extradition.”267 In fact, Congress does not seem to have held up its end 
of the bargain to police state conduct under the Compact Clause.268 
Despite this apparent under-enforcement of the Compact Clause by 
Congress, there nevertheless remains the specter that it could be used 
in order to mount an attack on state conduct through global 
governance networks, as Sloss has convincingly demonstrated in the 
context of California’s climate compacts discussed above.269 
2. Network Coordination vs. Compact Cooperation 
This problem can be overcome by a careful reading of the Holmes 
decisions through the lens of global governance networks and 
transnational legal process concerns. Despite constituting the high 
water market of the Compact Clause, Holmes significantly limits the 
 
 266.  Id. 
 267.  Fabien Gelinas, The Constitution of Agreement: A Brief Look at Sub-Federal Cross-
Border Cooperation, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1179, 1183 (2006) (citations omitted). 
 268.  Hollis, supra note 257, at 1078 (“Congress has refused its consent to foreign 
participation in a compact exactly once - in the 1968 Great Lakes Basin Compact (and even 
then only at the behest of a U.S. State Department concerned about conflicts with U.S. treaty 
obligations). Nor has Congress ever challenged a U.S. state’s agreement as a prohibited 
treaty.”). 
 269.  Sloss, supra note 123, at 524–26. 
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scope of the prohibition in the Compact Clause.270 Chief Justice Taney 
was careful to circumscribe his reasoning prohibiting the informal 
agreement between Vermont and British Canada. It was premised 
upon the factual predicate that Vermont “acts not with a view to 
protect itself, but to assist another nation which asks its aid.”271 
In other words, Holmes is express that its prohibition is in “no 
degree connected with the power of the states to remove from their 
territory any person whose presence they may think dangerous to 
their peace, or in any way injurious to their interests.”272 Chief Justice 
Taney is explicit that “the ordinary police powers of the states, which 
is necessary to their very existence . . . have never surrendered to the 
general government.”273 The state, in other words, may always act in 
its own interest. 
The rub of Holmes is that “[t]he state does not co-operate with a 
foreign government not [sic] hold any intercourse with it, when she is 
merely executing her police regulations.”274 The prohibition, even at 
its high water mark, requires some form of agreement that does not 
immediately advance the traditional police powers retained by the 
state. 
The global governance literature suggests a new reading of this 
case. Global governance networks rest upon the internalization of 
norms and coordination of behavior efficiently to achieve these 
internalized norms.275 Such networks do not rest upon traditional 
notions of cooperation, i.e. the bargained-for-exchange of something 
one oneself desires for something one is willing to give up to receive 
it.276 Global governance networks thus act on a unity of shared 
purposes, premised in shared internalized norms of network 
participants, and not traditional frameworks of dovetailing interests 
and the cooperative efficiencies they create.277 
An example can help to illustrate this fundamental difference. 
States at times offer tax breaks to multinational companies to relocate 
 
 270.  Gelinas, supra note 267, at 1183 (citations omitted). 
 271.  Holmes, 39 U.S. at 569. 
 272.  Id. at 568. 
 273.  Id. 
 274.  Id. at 569. 
 275.  See Section II.A. 
 276.  Sourgens, supra note 41, at 25.  
 277.  Id.; see also ROGER FISHER, GETTING TO YES, NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT 
GIVING IN 75 (3d ed. 2011) (discussing dovetailing differing interest in cooperative bargaining). 
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their headquarters.278 When a state offers such tax breaks, it is not 
acting on the basis of an internalized norm that taxing multinational 
companies is wrong.279 The tax break is bargained for and in exchange 
for the jobs and economic activity that the multinational company 
would bring to the state.280 The multinational and the state are thus 
cooperating in bringing new economic activity to the state.281 They are 
not, however, coordinating their behavior through a tax governance 
network. 
This perspective is helpful for understanding the consequence of 
Holmes for global governance networks. Holmes prohibits 
cooperation by states without Congressional approval under the 
Compact Clause. 282 In Holmes, this “cooperation” was the bargained-
for-exchange of the extradition of Holmes in implied exchange for 
future reciprocation of some sort.283 This kind of cooperation falls 
under the Compact Clause. 
But Holmes undoubtedly does not prohibit coordination. Holmes 
is clear that Vermont could have acted in good faith in furtherance of 
its own police power in expelling Mr. Holmes from the state.284 
Vermont could have coordinated with the Canadian authorities to 
secure that Mr. Holmes would not re-cross the border into Vermont 
after having been delivered to the Canadian border.285 Such 
coordination would meet the Holmes test because the state would 
simply have chosen to act on its own, ordinary, general powers in a 
certain, otherwise permissible, manner. 
In other words, the global governance perspective explains why 
Congress has not exercised its oversight power in the vast majority of 
apparent foreign state compacts.286 Most such compacts concern 
coordination of behavior rather than outright cooperation between 
 
 278.  See Che Odom, Tax Breaks Plentiful for Second Amazon HQ Even Without Bids, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar, 26, 2018), https://www.bna.com/tax-breaks-plentiful-n57982090371/ (“Many 
of the tight-lipped cities vying to become Amazon’s second home already offer incentives for 
economic development that would provide the online retailer with millions of dollars in tax 
breaks.”). 
 279.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 68. 
 280.  Id. 
 281.  See Che Odom, Tax Breaks Plentiful for Second Amazon HQ Even Without Bids, 
Bloomberg (Mar, 26, 2018), https://www.bna.com/tax-breaks-plentiful-n57982090371/. 
 282.  Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 569 (1840). 
 283.  Id. 
 284.  Id. at 568. 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 284. 
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states and foreign governments.287 Even Holmes, the high water mark 
of the foreign Compact Clause jurisprudence, would suggest that 
Congress has no authorizing role to play in this context. 288 The key 
reason that states are constitutionally permitted to enter into global 
governance networks is that these networks are premised upon the 
exercise of existing regulatory sovereignty in the states.289 As the 
exercise of regulatory sovereignty by the states deployed through 
global governance networks is directed at immediately achieving a 
permissible goal, the foreign affairs implications of their participation 
in these networks, from a constitutional perspective, are secondary. 
States are seeking to secure that domestic policies can, first, achieve 
their desired ends at all and, second, better achieve them by 
coordinating with foreign actors. States are seeking neither to engage 
in foreign diplomacy, nor to secure cooperative advantages through 
foreign engagements. They are instead enlisting the coordination of 
foreign actors to achieve domestic policy ends. 
What does this mean for our question, still left open in the current 
literature, as to when precisely federal foreign policy can preempt 
state law? Or inversely, what does it mean for state participation in 
foreign affairs through global governance networks? It means that 
absent Congressional or executive lawmaking action, states may 
remain engaged in foreign affairs up to certain constitutional limits. 
Centrally, Holmes stands for the proposition that states’ coordination 
of their actions with foreign nations is permissible even without 
Congressional approval so long as the states stay within the scope of 
their traditional sovereign domain.290 
B. The Limits of State Participation: The Role of Traditional Powers 
The general constitutional permissibility of state participation in 
global governance networks as such is only the first step. The 
conclusion that states may participate in global governance networks 
does not entail that every state attempt at participation will meet 
constitutional muster. What, then, are the limits of state participation 
in global governance networks? 
 
 287.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 280 (noting the broadly coordinating function 
of most foreign compacts as to which Congress has not acted). 
 288.  Holmes, 39 U.S. at 568. 
 289.  Sourgens, supra note 41. 
 290.  Holmes, 39 U.S. at 568. 
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The Holmes distinction relied upon a difference between 
permissible state coordination and potentially impermissible state 
cooperation with foreign actors under the Compact Clause.291 This 
distinction, discussed in the last section, assumes implicitly that the 
state had the authority to regulate the subject matter at issue in the 
absence of coordination.292 If the state lacked this authority, it could 
not use global coordination as a means to expand its powers. 
The more recent Compact Clause case U.S. Steel Corp. v. 
Multistate Tax Commission,293 addressing an interstate (as opposed to 
a foreign) Compact, makes this assumption express. U.S. Steel Corp. 
concerned the Multistate Tax Compact (MTC). Pursuant to the MTC, 
the states had set up a Commission to promote uniformity and 
compatibility in state tax systems.294 The state participants had failed 
to secure Congressional approval for the MTC, leading to the 
challenge.295 The U.S. Steel Corp. Court held that MTC did not trigger 
the Compact Clause because the “pact does not purport to authorize 
the member States to exercise any powers they could not exercise in 
its absence. Nor is there any delegation of sovereign power to the 
Commission.”296 
It is thus possible to combine Holmes and U.S. Steel Corp. 
Pursuant to Holmes, a state may coordinate its actions with a foreign 
counter-party. U.S. Steel Corp. adds that states are simply prohibited 
from invoking the network as justification “to exercise any powers 
they could not exercise in its absence.”297 
The question whether a state was entitled to act in the first place, 
even in the absence of a global governance network, is a useful 
heuristic. Its answer is not, however, a binary rubric. In many 
instances, the actions of the state involve complex webs of regulatory 
concerns that cannot easily be divorced from their global context. The 
analysis thus risks becoming circular: states may act with regard to 
matters impacting foreign affairs to the extent they have the authority 
to impact foreign affairs. Any such analysis would beg the question, as 
it would assume the authority it set out to discover. 
 
 291.  See Section III.A. 
 292.  See id. 
 293.  434 U.S. 452 (1978). 
 294.  Id. at 456.  
 295.  Id. at 454. 
 296.  Id. at 473. 
 297.  Compare id. with Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 568 (1840) (state action consistent 
with police powers is permissible). 
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Holmes again provides a useful starting point for this more 
complex analysis. Thus, in the words of that decision, “[t]he state does 
not co-operate with a foreign government not [sic] hold any 
intercourse with it, when she is merely executing her police 
regulations.”298 The closer the link between a state’s conduct and its 
police powers, the stronger its claim to coordination through global 
governance networks without requiring any Congressional approval 
for its actions. 
This concern for police powers as the limit of permissible state 
conduct must be viewed in the historical context that gave us Holmes. 
In this context, police powers denoted the role of the state “to take 
care of the community more broadly.”299 Specifically, it required 
keeping the public peace, providing for public health, securing the 
means of economic prosperity, and protecting public morals within 
the community.300 The state traditionally, in other words, may act for 
the common welfare of its residents.301 
This rubric of appraising state conduct through the lens of 
historical police powers can make sense of the frequently criticized 
decision in Zschernig v. Miller. As discussed above, Zschernig involved 
an Oregon law that disqualified heirs from inheriting to the extent 
that the laws in their home states did not effectively recognize the 
right to private property.302 The case arose after the death of 
Oregonians who had died intestate.303 The heirs of the Oregonians at 
issue were East German residents who were prevented by the 
Oregonian statute to inherit, leading the property to escheat to 
Oregon.304 The Supreme Court concluded that Oregon impermissibly 
encroached upon the foreign policy prerogatives of the federal 
government by making value judgments about the desirability of 
communism and the right to hold private property.305 The decision has 
been heavily criticized in the foreign affairs literature for the reasons 
already outlined in Section I. Importantly, it has also been treated as 
 
 298.  Holmes, 39 U.S. at 568. 
 299.  Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 745, 763 (2007). 
 300.  Id. 
 301.  Id. The state must stay within its zone of competence set out by the dormant 
commerce clause. The concern here is, however, domestic, i.e. interstate commerce rather than 
some additional scrutiny imposed by international commerce clause concerns. See Section I. 
 302.  Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
 303.  Id. at 430. 
 304.  Id.  
 305.  Id. at 441. 
SOURGENS_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2019  9:18 PM 
144 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 14 
inconsistent with current jurisprudence that is more permissive of 
state action in the realm of foreign affairs.306 If Zschernig could be 
integrated into a broader framework that could also yield permissive 
results based upon context, it would thus be possible to provide a 
theory that is descriptively more encompassing—a theory that 
identifies aspects of jurisprudence that the current frames of reference 
may not fully appreciate. 
To make sense of this decision in the Holmes framework of police 
powers, it is important to situate where on the police power spectrum 
the Oregon law would fit. The short answer is that it does not fit at all. 
The provision does little to nothing to protect the public welfare of 
Oregonians. As the Clark decision reached earlier in light of 
California legislation makes clear, states may in fact require 
reciprocity from foreign countries in the probate context.307 They thus 
may protect the rights of their own (Californian or Oregonian) 
residents to inherit abroad by making foreign inheritance conditional 
upon reciprocity and thus encourage foreign jurisdictions to permit 
their own (Californian or Oregonian) residents to inherit in turn.308 
The Oregonian provision barring inheritance on the basis of political 
creed does little to advance this interest further. 
As the law does not provide any tangible benefit to Oregonian 
residents, this leaves the protection of public morals as the only 
traditional police power reason for the Oregonian provision 
preventing an Eastern German national to inherit on the basis of his 
home state laws.309 But the existence of communist laws abroad does 
not directly affect public morals in Oregon. To the contrary, any 
attempt by Oregon to impose its public morals in East Germany 
would violate the principle of sovereign equality that “[e]very State 
has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and 
cultural systems, without interference in any form by another 
State.”310 The relationship of the Oregon law to traditional police 
powers therefore is tenuous at best, and an internationally wrongful 
intrusion upon sovereign equality at worst. It thus invites precisely the 
 
 306.  Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 25, at 1918. 
 307.  Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 506 (1947). 
 308.  Id. 
 309.  See Legarre, supra note 299, at 763 (listing police powers). 
 310.  Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8082/Annex (1970). 
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kind of functionalist rationale adopted by the Zschernig court.311 But 
even Zschernig was not defined by this rationale but instead also 
rested on a more traditional appraisal of state police powers. 
This does not mean that the state may not act to give voice to 
deeply held public moral commitments. The Crosby decision, 
discussed above, in principle confirms that states have the power of 
the purse to bar state entities from buying goods or services from 
companies acting in jurisdictions that the state wishes to boycott.312 
Absent affirmative obstacles placed in its way by federal law, the state 
may follow reasons of public morals to spend its money as it sees fit.313 
The decision in Garamendi also showcases that the state may have a 
regulatory interest in demanding regulatory disclosures consistent 
with its public morals-based goals.314 In both cases, it would be fair to 
infer that state laws would have survived scrutiny in the complete 
absence of any federal action. These decisions thus, intriguingly, are a 
departure from both the rationale and language of Zschernig without 
being necessarily inconsistent with its underlying operational logic.315 
In short, the police power rationale for permissible coordination 
by states through formal or loose global governance networks, 
developed through a careful reading of Holmes, holds up against a 
review of the key foreign affairs cases that have given the literature a 
reasonable amount of difficulty.316 It highlights that this coordination 
is always a matter of means and degree: no area of state conduct is per 
se unconstitutional, even if certain means chosen by a state may well 
stray outside of traditional police powers. States, therefore, may 
participate in global governance networks as a categorical matter. 
They are, however, limited by their traditional powers in coordinating 
their actions consistent with these networks. Whether the means 
chosen to coordinate their actions are permissible will require a 
granular analysis of the law or regulation in application. And a 
 
 311.  Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 25, at 1918. 
 312.  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 367 (2000). 
 313.  Id. 
 314.  Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 399 (2003). 
 315.  See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 25, at 1921 (“And while the Court in Crosby v. 
National Foreign Trade Council held that Massachusetts’ sanctions on Burma were preempted 
by the federal sanctions regime, some scholars immediately viewed the opinion as notable for its 
failure to rely on exceptionalist arguments.” (citations omitted)); see also Michael Reisman, 
Myth System and Operational Code, 3 YALE J. INT’L L. 230, 231 (1977) (defining operational 
code as “the unofficial but nonetheless effective guideline for behavior” in contradistinction to a 
myth system of the “norm system of the official picture”). 
 316.  Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 568 (1840). 
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decision that one choice strays beyond permissible boundaries does 
not mean that the state may not act in other ways to give voice to the 
same internalized global norms. 
C. Balancing Considerations 
Not all state exercises of police powers are created equal. And 
foreign policy decisions are not interchangeable variables. Rather, 
state police powers and foreign policy decisions, respectively, exist on 
a continuum. The jurisprudence reflects this basic, contextual reality. 
On the side of police powers, the Court’s jurisprudence already 
foreshadows skepticism regarding the more adventuresome state 
forays into foreign policy. As discussed in the previous section, 
Zschernig is consistent with the view that the tacit imposition of 
Oregon public morals upon a foreign state was beyond the scope of a 
state’s police powers.317 But Garamendi and Crosby, too, reflect a 
similar attitude on the reasonable limitation of state authority. 
In Garamendi, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the 
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) has the thinnest of 
connections to California: on its face, it addresses claims accruing in 
Europe;318 the underlying policies were issued in Europe between 
1920 and 1945;319 and it reaches affiliates of companies currently doing 
business in California, rather than only companies doing business in 
California themselves.320 The regulatory interest would certainly have 
been greater if the law concerned California policies or more directly 
implicated California claims. As is, the current link of decades-old 
insurance products to California appears more pretext than 
regulatory necessity to secure the stability of the California insurance 
market. 
Similarly, in Crosby, while the state has an indubitable interest in 
spending public moneys consistently with public morals, the inclusion 
in the Massachusetts Burma Law’s boycott of products and services 
provided solely on account of corporate affiliation seems to stretch 
the police power rationale to the breaking point.321 It is certainly 
reasonable that Massachusetts did not want to purchase products or 
services that came directly from or through Burma (contemporary 
 
 317.  Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 435 (1968). 
 318.  Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 409–10. 
 319.  Id. 
 320.  Id. 
 321.  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 382 (2000). 
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Myanmar). It is less reasonable to extend this concern to any products 
and services simply because of corporate co-ownership of another 
affiliate doing business in Burma.322 
Conversely, both cases also involved areas in which the executive 
traditionally has had significant foreign policy authority. Claim 
settlements are a traditional subject matter for sole executive 
agreements.323 They also lend themselves to a functionalist view, 
borrowed from international law, that the national executive, and only 
the national executive, can in fact release claims on the international 
plane.324 The underlying concern in California’s regulation was that 
Holocaust-era claims be settled fairly, as the name of the law already 
implies.325 This concern thus shaded into an area traditionally reserved 
to other actors. 
Similarly, the question of economic sanctions is a matter of federal 
concern, at least from a functional, if not from a textualist, perspective. 
As one recent study argues, economic sanctions directed at foreign 
states are the modern day substitute for warfare.326 This would suggest 
a functional rationale to assign responsibility for such conduct to the 
federal government—even if the historical novelty of the means 
would fit only uneasily over the text of the Constitution.327 The forays 
by states to try their hands at economic sanctions targeting companies 
doing business with foreign states come perilously close to an 
importantly federal domain.328 
A balance of traditional state police powers against traditional 
federal foreign affairs powers thus allows a clearer view of what the 
jurisprudence actually does; such a view is also doctrinally consistent 
with the Compact Clause. The weaker the link between traditional 
police powers and state conduct, the more probable it is that the state 
 
 322.  Id. 
 323.  Harold Hongju Koh, Twenty-First-Century International Lawmaking, 101 GEO. L.J. 
725, 732 (2013) (discussing Pink and Belmont). There is an “exceptionalist” justification in 
international law for this assignment of responsibilities as claim settlements are a traditional 
area for executive commitments be it through unilateral acts or by means of the conclusion of a 
treaty. For a discussion of why this exercise of authority is “exceptionalist” in the U.S. context, 
see Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 25, at 1915. For a historical discussion of unilateral actions 
by the President, see Sourgens, supra note 41, at 22–34. 
 324.  David Leys, Diplomatic Protection and Individual Rights: A Complementary 
Approach, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1, 4–6 (2015). 
 325.  Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 409–10. 
 326.  HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 36, at 388–89. 
 327.  Id. 
 328.  Id. 
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is acting in a manner inconsistent with the federalist equilibrium. The 
stronger the traditional federal competence with regard to the area in 
question, the stronger the claim to federal supremacy. This means that 
any action by the federal government that is not easily harmonized 
with state law at the extreme end of the spectrum of both axioms 
(traditional police powers vs. traditional federal competence) would 
thus present an instance in which foreign policy would trump state 
law. At that end of the spectrum, it would not matter whether the 
federal government acted pursuant to an executive agreement (as it 
did in Garamendi), acted in the scope of its foreign policy discretion 
(as provided by Congressional legislation in Crosby), or acted to 
reverse course consistent with its mandate. 
The Court has been mindful of these broader realities its 
treatment of state laws. It has not drawn bright line rules prohibiting 
states from participating in global governance networks or 
internalizing international norms into their respective laws. But 
neither has it given states a blank check. Rather, it has weighed the 
respective state and federal sovereign interests against each other in 
demarcating the proper scope of state coordination and 
internalization of international norms. Given the Court’s current 
near-allergic reaction to making sweeping bright line 
pronouncements, this is unlikely to change in the near future as a 
descriptive matter.329 
As a normative matter, commentators have submitted that such a 
balancing test is undesirable. They argue that “[a]d hoc judicial 
judgment based on particular factual situations would seldom be 
susceptible to generalization. It would be difficult for state officials to 
predict what would fall on one side of the line or the other, potentially 
wreaking havoc on federal-state relations.”330 The transnational legal 
process lens casts more than some doubt on this assertion. State and 
federal officials are engaged in overlapping webs of global 
governance networks.331 As network participants, they each answer to 
the frictions created by the other—and frequently intend to do so.332 
 
 329.  Dahlia Lithwick, The Supreme Court Is Not Going to Save You, SLATE (June 18, 2018), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/in-gill-v-whitford-and-benisek-v-lamone-john-
roberts-supreme-court-shows-its-too-afraid-to-do-anything.html; Eugne Volokh, The Year of 
the Punt, or At Least the Bunt, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 18, 2018 11:04 
am), http://reason.com/volokh/2018/06/18/the-year-of-the-punt-or-at-least-of-the.   
 330.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 135. 
 331.  See Section II. 
 332.  Id. 
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They are using policy tools strategically to advance their own norm 
internalizations over rival norm internalizations.333 
A balancing test is alive to the fact that the assertion of state 
legislative power is a communicative act in this larger conversation. 
As will become even more apparent in the next section, by balancing 
state against federal concerns, a balancing test takes this exchange 
seriously as a dialogue or conversation rather than exclusively 
listening to one side. By considering both sides to federal-state 
relations seriously, this balancing test thus protects these relations as 
relations rather than imposing hierarchical norms that would make 
engagement—that is, relationships—impossible. It thus again confirms 
that while state participation in global governance networks is 
presumptively constitutional, some of the results of state participation 
may well not pass constitutional muster. 
This balancing test, moreover, can explain another potentially 
perplexing schism in the foreign affairs law literature. The foreign 
affairs law literature currently claims both that there is an increase in 
foreign affairs exceptionalism—the position that foreign affairs 
decisions are constitutionally different from other, domestic matters 
of constitutional concerns on functionalist grounds—and a trend 
towards foreign affairs normalization.334 On its face, it would appear 
that both literatures could not inhabit the same legal universe. 
The balancing test for the appraisal of state conduct in global 
governance networks oddly confirms that that both camps are correct. 
Traditional federalism questions have increasing currency in decisions 
applying facially to foreign affairs disputes precisely because 
globalization has forced an ever-greater intrusion of “foreign affairs” 
into our daily lives.335 As states have a role to play in setting their own 
agendas in these areas pursuant to their traditional police powers, 
 
 333.  Id. 
 334.  Compare Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 25, at 1897 (arguing that “the Supreme 
Court has increasingly rejected the idea that foreign affairs are different from domestic affairs. 
Instead, it has started treating foreign relations issues as if they were run-of-the-mill domestic 
policy issues, suitable for judicial review and governed by ordinary separation of powers and 
statutory interpretation principles”) with David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan 
Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583 (2017) (submitting a re-
appraisal of exceptionalism in the immigration context) and GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 
16, at 300 (“[F]ew other issues [other than immigration] . . . as starkly pose one of the core 
tensions within foreign affairs federalism.”). 
 335.  See Jan Dalhuisen, Globalization and the Transnationalization of Commercial and 
Financial Law, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 19, 21 (2015) (discussing the global trade implications 
for everyday consumer goods). 
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foreign affairs look a lot more like domestic affairs, as the literature 
has noted.336 At the same time, however, the executive has become 
ever more adept at using its own traditional foreign affairs powers, 
enjoyed as a matter of international law, to drive policy, including 
policy with significant domestic repercussions.337 This has given rise to 
a justifiable impression of greater foreign affairs exceptionalism.338 
Importantly, both trends currently co-exist and consequently cannot 
be read apart from each other. Exceptionalism and normalization are 
thus flipsides of the same coin, the difference between them merely a 
matter of which perspective one uses to approach constitutional 
balancing. The fact that both co-exist in the literature thus again 
supports that a balancing test is the descriptively most apt rubric to 
capture the current state of the law, pace the normative qualms raised 
by some. 
D. Framework Agreements 
Professor Sloss places an important obstacle in the way of formal 
state coordination through formal global governance networks and 
state participation in transnational legal processes. He notes that there 
is some support for requiring Congressional approval for state 
compacts that commit a state to participate in a network for a fixed 
period of time.339 He looks in particular to the Linking Agreement 
between California and Quebec, which provides in relevant part that a 
“party may withdraw from this Agreement by giving 12 months notice 
to the other party.”340 Such a provision could not be revoked by the 
state at its discretion.341 This would run afoul of the state’s “unfettered 
power to withdraw” from the network and thus would again require 
Congressional approval.342 
The potential obstacle that Sloss identifies is important. The 
agreements formalizing global governance networks frequently 
 
 336.  Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 25. 
 337.  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 1253. 
 338.  Id. at 1253–54. 
 339.  Sloss, supra note 123, at 524–25. 
 340.  Agreement Between the California Air Resources Board and the Gouvernement du 
Québec Concerning the Harmonization and Integration of Cap-and-Trade Programs for 
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, art. 16, CAL. AIR RES. BD. (Sept. 27, 2013), 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/ca_quebec_linking_agreement_english.pdf 
[hereinafter California-Quebec Agreement].  
 341.  Sloss, supra note 123, at 524–25. 
 342.  Id. (quoting Applicability of the Compact Clause to Use of Multiple State Entities 
Under the Water Resources Planning Act, 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 828 (1980)). 
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include termination provisions intended to signal that the network is 
not purely ad hoc in nature.343 If the inclusion of such provisions per se 
would require Congressional approval, many formal global 
governance mechanisms would be beyond the independent reach of 
the states. 
The first question, therefore, becomes whether the requirement 
that Sloss identifies is otherwise consistent with the frame developed 
thus far. Significantly, the jurisprudence Sloss relies upon is in fact 
consistent with the coordination/cooperation distinction developed on 
the basis of Holmes, in the foreign state compact context above, and 
draws expressly upon U.S. Steel Corp.344 Sloss focuses in particular 
upon a passage in U.S. Steel Corp. in which the Court held that “each 
State retains complete freedom to adopt or reject the rules and 
regulations of the Commission. Moreover, as noted above, each State 
is free to withdraw at any time.”345 
Given this overall overlap in the analytical frame between U.S. 
Steel Corp. and Holmes, Sloss’s reading of U.S. Steel Corp. thus raises 
the question whether a framework agreement setting up an otherwise 
coordinative global governance network becomes cooperative in 
nature simply by including a termination provision, like the 
California-Quebec Linking Agreement.346 Luckily for state 
participation global governance networks, this is by no means a 
foregone conclusion. 
In the context of the Linking Agreement Sloss analyzes, it is 
central to understand the consequence of non-compliance with any 
term of the agreement—including its termination provisions. This 
consequence is spelled out in Article 18, entitled “Resolution of 
Disputes.”347 This mechanism calls for consultations between the 
parties “using and building on established working relationships.”348 
Failure to abide by the termination provision does not trigger any 
enforceable legal right under the Agreement.349 Rather, Quebec’s 
potential complaint that California failed to coordinate is only fruitful 
 
 343.  This was one of the reasons for such a provision in the Paris Agreement. See Sourgens, 
supra note 41, at 111. 
 344.  Sloss, supra note 123, at 524–25. 
 345.  U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978). 
 346.  Sloss, supra note 123, at 524–25. 
 347.  California-Quebec Agreement, supra note 340, at art. 18. 
 348.  Id. 
 349.  Id. 
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if California wishes to continue to coordinate in accordance with the 
dispute resolution provision in Article 18. 
The dispute resolution provision thus ensures that neither party 
bargained for the continued coordination by the other in exchange for 
its own continued coordination. The Agreement works if, and only if, 
all participants wish to engage each other. Agreements worded in this 
manner would tend to pass muster under both Holmes and U.S. Steel 
despite the exit provision precisely because states cannot be forced to 
coordinate.350 Signatories of formal agreements constituting a 
governance network, including state signatories, thus can include 
provisions requiring fixed withdrawal periods so long as a failure to 
abide by them does not give rise to justiciable or enforceable rights. 
The exit provision in those instances is hortatory and expresses a 
permissible desire to coordinate, rather than an impermissible 
commitment to do so. 
E. Conclusion 
Where does this leave us? As a general rule, there is no 
constitutional obstacle to state participation in global governance 
networks. There is thus no per se obstacle to state resistance to federal 
foreign policy through participation in global governance networks. 
The balancing test pitting traditional state police powers against 
traditional federal foreign affairs competence creates a more granular 
perspective on how states may participate in foreign affairs. It also 
creates a less clear picture of how or when they may do so and how 
the federal government might respond to preempt or limit state 
forays. 
The balancing test drawn up through the global governance 
perspective also leads to another surprising result. It possible to read 
consistently jurisprudence that the literature has suggested is 
incongruous. Principally, it is possible to account for the Supreme 
Court decisions in Zschernig and Garamendi that are typically 
associated with an exceptionalist view of the special nature of foreign 
affairs questions, together with a view that is more permissive of state 
participation on traditional federalism grounds in foreign affairs.351 It 
is therefore possible to reconstitute a fuller picture of constitutional 
tradition than was previously possible. The next section will lay this 
 
 350.  U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 473; Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 568 (1840). 
 351.  Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 25, at 1913. 
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new rubric over the states of resistance in Section II to seek to 
establish whether the state of resistance developed in Section II is 
itself constitutionally relevant or predictive of how much deference 
federal executive foreign policy (and particularly a foreign policy of 
disengagement) will command in the face of inconsistent state law. 
IV. REMAPPING NETWORK CONFLICTS 
The Article so far has developed two rubrics to understand how 
state entry into the transnational legal process creates resistance to 
federal foreign policy. Section II outlined how states create different 
types of resistance through their participation in global governance 
networks. Section III outlined which constitutional constraints the 
Compact Clause places on state conduct in global governance 
networks. This section now combines both perspectives and asks two 
questions. First, what are the preconditions for the states to be 
constitutionally permitted to resist foreign policy? Second, what can 
the federal government do to overcome this resistance? 
A. Check on Defection 
The most topical resistance by states to federal foreign policy is to 
act as a check on defection by the federal government from global 
governance networks. When may a state act as such a check on 
defection? Section III has outlined that the state must have an 
ostensible reason to legislate or regulate grounded in its own police 
powers.352 It thus must act to protect the public safety and welfare of 
its residents.353 Alternatively, it can attempt to use its spending powers 
as a means to implement policy.354 
In the context of California’s recent actions to challenge the 
Trump administration’s announced defection from the Paris 
Agreement, the first question is whether California has any 
independent police power rationale to implement its own climate 
rules. As a coastal state with a high population density and drought-
induced wildfires responsible for billions of dollars in property 
damage, California’s interest in climate regulation is hard to write off 
as pure pretext.355 
 
 352.  See Section III.A–B. 
 353.  See Section III.B. 
 354.  Id. 
 355.  Brian Clark Howard, 5 Key Threats to California from Climate Change, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 12, 2014), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/08/140812-
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This leaves the additional question: whether the federal 
environmental law framework has preempted all climate regulation 
by California. The answer again is “no.” By its terms, the principal law 
at issue in preempting state environmental laws on climate change, 
the Clean Air Act, does not preempt state action with regard to the 
environment as a categorical matter.356 While the Clean Air Act grants 
considerable discretion to a federal agency, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, this discretion is not absolute.357 California thus 
has regulatory authority and may exercise this regulatory authority by 
coordinating with foreign states to achieve California’s goal of 
mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and thus protecting the welfare 
of Californian residents. 
This further leaves the question of how the federal government 
can act nevertheless to preempt unwelcome state regulation resisting 
defection. If the state regulatory interest has a relatively thin basis in 
state police powers, a mere statement of foreign policy to exit from 
existing mechanisms may suffice to stop state action under the 
balancing test developed in Section III. By analogy to Garamendi, the 
federal government prevailed on a mere statement of foreign policy 
rather than preemption through an executive agreement.358 Such 
policy statements should prevail irrespective of whether federal 
foreign policy is to engage in greater cooperation with foreign states, 
as was the case in Garamendi, or the opposite. 
If the state has a legitimate police powers argument and its ability 
to regulate a subject matter has been well-established, as is the case in 
the context of the Clean Air Act, the federal government would have 
 
california-climate-change-global-warming-science/#close.  
 356.  42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2018) (“Except as otherwise provided in sections 1857c–10(c), (e), 
and (f) (as in effect before August 7, 1977), 7543, 7545(c)(4), and 7573 of this title (preempting 
certain State regulation of moving sources) nothing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the 
right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or 
limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or 
abatement of air pollution; except that if an emission standard or limitation is in effect under an 
applicable implementation plan or under section 7411 or section 7412 of this title, such State or 
political subdivision may not adopt or enforce any emission standard or limitation which is less 
stringent than the standard or limitation under such plan or section.”). See also JJ England, 
Saving Preemption in the Clean Air Act: Climate Change, State Common Law, and Plaintiffs 
Without a Remedy, 43 ENVTL. L. 701, 733–35 (discussing preemption under the Clean Air Act).  
 357.  Lisa Heinzerling, The Clean Air Act and the Constitution, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 121, 127 (2001) (discussing the Clean Air Act’s imposition of limits on EPA discretion in 
the context of NAAQS). 
 358.  Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421, 424 (2003). 
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to do more than express a policy choice.359 It would need to take 
affirmative regulatory action either to preempt state law directly or to 
regulate in such a manner that the state law in question is an obvious 
obstacle to the attainment of the federal policy goal.360 
In the context of defection, such regulatory action may require 
additional legislation beyond the attempt by the executive to pass 
preemptory regulations. To the extent that a prior administration has 
committed the United States to internationally binding obligations, a 
successor administration could only undo those commitments as a 
constitutional matter if it had express authorization from Congress to 
regulate in violation of international law pursuant to the Charming 
Betsey canon.361 As discussed in the Paris Paradigm, federal law is 
presumptively read so as not violate the international legal obligation 
of the United States.362 An executive policy of defection that violates 
international law thus requires express Congressional authorization to 
be validly promulgated.363 An invalidly promulgated regulation 
logically cannot preempt state law. The specter of defection thus raises 
the need for further Congressional action to ratify executive foreign 
policy. 
B. States as Allies in National Network Conflicts 
States have acted as allies in national network conflicts as 
discussed in the Crosby example relating to Massachusetts’s Burma 
Law above.364 The constitutional analysis developed above is helpful 
in creating a rubric for how states can most effectively use their 
powers to take sides in national network conflicts. Most immediately, 
states must be careful to use an appropriate mechanism to take sides 
in an issue that also involves federal interests directly. Thus, the 
Zschernig decision makes clear that state laws that are grounded 
fundamentally in public morals of the forum state, but seek to extend 
those morals beyond state territory, will probably be struck down.365 
State participation in human rights discourses, in particular, will 
 
 359.  Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 
879, 892–910 (2008) (discussing the constitutionality of state climate change laws and 
regulations). 
 360.  Id. 
 361.  Sourgens, supra note 41, at 49–51.  
 362.  Id. 
 363.  Id. 
 364.  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 375 (2000). 
 365.  Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968). 
SOURGENS_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2019  9:18 PM 
156 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 14 
probably to encounter this problem. As the Crosby decision made 
clear, however, the use of spending powers remains open even in 
these scenarios to organize a boycott in a manner that passes 
constitutional muster.366 
The federal government has significantly more tools at its disposal 
to react to state involvement in these instances. In the first instance, 
Congress can pass an act to empower the executive to promulgate 
policy on the area in question and implement a broader 
Congressional mandate.367 This is what Congress in fact did in 
Crosby.368 Such Congressional action typically will receive significant 
deference even if it might, on its face, be possible to require 
compliance with both state and federal law.369 This deference is 
implicit in the fact that federal actors are already participating in 
global governance networks—meaning that there is probably a 
significant federal interest at stake. It is further inherent in many of 
the functionalist concerns arising out of international law, because the 
network conflict will have immediate repercussions on the world 
stage and will potentially bring about international legal liability for 
the U.S., as was threatened in Crosby.370 
Additionally, the executive may be able rely on existing delegation 
of regulatory powers by Congress.371 If the state has acted through 
direct legislation rather than spending powers, the federal government 
can simply seek to regulate the subject matter of state laws itself and 
thus preempt state laws as inconsistent with federal regulations.372 
This means that such conflicts will be a reasonably tempting field 
to assert that federal foreign policy (and even federal foreign policy of 
disengagement) can preempt state law. The discretion afforded federal 
agencies in crafting a response to such national network conflicts will 
be reasonably expansive. In both instances, however, it is important to 
note that state laws cannot be preempted on foreign policy grounds as 
such without any Congressional or administrative action. Rather, it 
will take some further regulatory action to preempt by negative 
implication, as was the case in Crosby, meaning that state conduct will 
 
 366.  Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372, 375. 
 367.  Id. at 372. 
 368.  Id. 
 369.  Id. 
 370.  Id. 
 371.  David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1147–53 (2012) 
(discussing administrative preemption). 
 372.  Id. 
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likely have met its underlying policy goals, namely to further 
engagement by federal actors with the problem in question.373 A 
policy of disengagement, in other words, must be clearly articulated to 
be given deference.374 
C. States as Independent Sources of Conflict 
States can enter into independent global governance networks 
and coordinate their regulatory actions even in the absence of any 
federal participation. The key question for such legislation or 
regulation will be whether the state can advance a plausible police 
power rationale for its actions.375 If it can do so, the foreign affairs 
impact of the state’s conduct will not of itself create an impediment. 
The legislative scope of state action at issue in Crosby and Garamendi 
further indicates that state police powers will be broadly understood 
for purposes of the Compact Clause analysis.376 
The federal government is not powerless to act in overcoming 
such new and independent conflicts. By their nature, however, these 
independent networks may well fall more squarely in the realm of 
traditional state police powers. This will mean that federal action will 
need to overcome a higher burden to preempt state law passed 
consistently with such independent networks. This, thus, is one area in 
which federal foreign policy probably will not preempt state law; it is 
even less probable that a federal foreign policy of disengagement 
would be able to achieve this end. 
In this regard, independent state networks invert the scenario in 
which states act as a drag on new national networks. To overcome 
cooperative endeavors, it may well be necessary for Congress to act 
with sufficient specificity to preempt state law. Congress further will 
have to act within its enumerated powers. Such coordination, in other 
words, may be the most difficult for the federal government to 
overcome or enjoin simply because these independent state networks 
are the most likely to implicate core state responsibilities and more 
tangential federal responsibilities. 
United States v. Bond377 may be a case in point. The issue in Bond 
was the Convention on Chemical Weapons and the Chemical 
 
 373.  Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372, 375. 
 374.  Id. at 372. 
 375.  See Section III.B. 
 376.  Crosby, 530 U.S. at 375; Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421, 424 (2003). 
 377.  572 U.S. 844 (2014). 
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Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998.378 Bond involved a 
federal prosecution, pursuant to the Chemical Weapons 
Implementation Act of 1998, of a micro-biologist who had used an 
arsenic-based compound to attempt to poison her friend for sleeping 
with her husband.379 The Roberts court in Bond ruled that the 
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 could be 
not be read to upset “the constitutional balance between the National 
Government and the States.”380 Consequently, the use of the Chemical 
Weapons Implementation Act of 1998 to prosecute “traditionally local 
criminal conduct” would be an unreasonable extension of the 
statute.381 
Centrally, the Court ruled that “the background principle that 
Congress does not normally intrude upon the police power of the 
States is critically important. In light of that principle, we are reluctant 
to conclude that Congress meant to punish Bond’s crime with a 
federal prosecution for a chemical weapons attack.”382 This conclusion 
can be applied, one-to-one, to the creation of global governance 
networks by the states in areas that fall squarely within “the police 
power of the States.”383 In this area, there would be a presumption 
against Congressional authorization for federal action.384 
This presumption against Congressional authorization mirrors the 
presumption against a violation of a different international order by 
Congress. The Court announced a presumption in the Charming 
Betsey case that Congress is presumed not to authorize the United 
States to violate international law.385 The Charming Betsey canon 
allows that Congress may enact a law that violates international law if 
it does so clearly. 
This presumption may well be read after Bond to apply similarly 
to Congressional action that would violate the traditional boundaries 
between state and federal responsibility.386 Congress has the power to 
do so in one particular circumstance outlined in Missouri v. 
 
 378.  Id. at 848. 
 379.  Id. at 852. 
 380.  Id. at 862. 
 381.  Id. at 863. 
 382.  Id. 
 383.  Id. 863. 
 384.  Id. 
 385.  Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). 
 386.  Bond, 572 U.S. at 863. 
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Holland.387 It can ratify and implement a treaty pursuant to the 
necessary and proper clause of the Constitution and thus supersede 
traditional state police powers by passing legislation ancillary to the 
treaty power.388 The point of Bond is that implementing legislation 
will be read to do so only if the legislation overcomes the presumption 
in question.389 
The same presumption was at issue in Medellin v. Texas.390 There, 
the federal government sought to set aside capital murder convictions 
on the basis of a judgment by the ICJ ruling that Texas (that is, the 
United States) failed to abide by the terms of the Vienna Consular 
Relations Convention.391 As discussed above, the Court determined 
that the treaty obligations did not displace Texas law as they were not 
self-executing.392 Centrally, the Medellin court implicitly applied the 
same presumption that would later be articulated in Bond: federal 
action to displace state police powers would need to be clearly 
articulated in appropriate implementing legislation by Congress.393 
This means that ultimately states are at their most secure when 
they act pursuant to their police powers in independent global 
governance networks (after all, the federal government has no reason 
to join those networks). They similarly act at their most secure when 
resisting federal foreign policy that encroaches upon traditional state 
powers. These conflicts most clearly align constitutional and global 
governance networks rubrics. They are thus the areas in which states 
may provide the most unfettered resistance to federal foreign policy—
and to federal law. 
D. Amplitude Conflict and Preemption 
This leaves amplitude conflicts between states and the federal 
government. These conflicts in many ways leave states in their 
weakest position. They involve state resistance to existing federal law 
or regulation. Such conflicts thus directly trigger preemption concerns 
because, by definition, the federal government has already 
promulgated rules or passed legislation regarding the subject matter 
 
 387.  Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).  
 388.  Id. 
 389.  Bond, 572 U.S. at 863. 
 390.  Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525–32 (2008). 
 391.  Id. 
 392.  Id. 
 393.  Id.; Bond, 572 U.S. at 863. 
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of state law or regulation.394 
Such conflicts will ultimately turn on a comparison of the 
respective regulatory interests as well as the clarity with which 
Congress has preempted state laws or regulations in question.395 If the 
federal government has acted in a constitutional manner, federal 
interests will, by definition, be well-established, because it would have 
acted pursuant to its constitutional powers.396 This would leave the 
question: does the authorizing statute at issue carve out a role for 
consistent state legislation?397 If it does, the state legislation or 
regulation further would have to be compared with the overall 
purpose of the federal statutory regime. A true amplitude challenge—
one in which the federal government intended to halt at a certain 
regulatory measure—would therefore have a difficult road to travel. 
Amplitude challenges are likely to result in preemption of state 
law on the basis of federal foreign policy—even a policy of 
disengagement. Absent a clear statutory authorization for states to 
impose standards independent from federal regulation, federal policy 
will likely receive deference.398 This deference applies both to 
regulation actually promulgated by the federal government and 
regulation that has not been implemented as a policy tool.399 
Administrative preemption and other federal administrative policy 
tools, in other words, are likely to swallow amplitude conflicts due to 
administrative delegation doctrine.400 
An amplitude challenge can still play an important role in 
generating policy debate. Even in this context, federalism challenges 
typically occur after the state law or regulation has been 
promulgated.401 This means that the merits of the state regulation—
and the nature of its tailoring to meet specific traditional state police 
powers concerns—would have to be litigated. Such litigation will 
 
 394.  See Section II. 
 395.  See Section III.C. 
 396.  U.S. CONST. art I. 
 397.  As discussed, the Clean Air Act does so in important respects. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2018). 
 398.  See Miriam Seifter, Federalism at Step Zero, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 637 (2014) 
(“Federalism values can be considered effectively, and with fewer negative consequences, in the 
more encompassing reasonableness analysis that courts perform in the ordinary two steps of the 
Chevron framework, and in arbitrary and capricious review.”). 
 399.  See id. at 648 (outlining how federal agencies can curb state discretion through 
preemption and other tools). 
 400.  Id. See also Rubenstein, supra note 371, at 1147–53 (discussing administrative 
preemption). 
 401.  See Rubenstein, supra note 371, at 1147–53 (discussing administrative preemption). 
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highlight sensitive policy concerns as well as create a record for future 
administrative rulemaking procedures. Even a doomed state foray 
may thus keep alive a policy discourse in ways that will affect future 
rule making by federal authorities. 
E. Conclusion 
The states of resistance mapped in Part II each fit differently over 
the constitutional rubrics developed in Part III. In combination, the 
transnational legal process literature and the Compact Clause 
jurisprudence develop a coherent theory of how states can act as 
constituent participants in transnational legal processes.402 This theory 
can answer the question left open by the existing literature: whether a 
federal foreign policy of disengagement can preempt state law and 
policy of global engagement through global governance networks. 
This answer is nuanced and takes into account the different types 
of resistance and the relative interests of states and federal actors in 
pursuing their respective policies. It further depoliticizes the foreign 
affairs rubrics from the specifics of the underlying state law at issue 
and thus provides a meaningfully value neutral means to appraise the 
state-federal government conflict. Finally, it provides a further 
analytical means to drill down deeper into the foreign affairs 
jurisprudence and find surprising dynamics of continuity across 
seemingly inconsistent case law. It thus can make sense of when and 
how the federal government will receive significant deference for 
policy statements to overcome state law, while at the same time 
making sense of instances in which even implementing legislation 
passed by Congress under its treaty powers will not upset settled state 
law in other regards. 
The Article so far does more than answer the original question of 
whether foreign policy—particularly a negative foreign policy of 
disengagement—can preempt inconsistent state law. It provides a map 
of state participation in the dynamics of global life. This is important. 
In the words of Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, 
The internal process of decision is affected by the complexities of a 
division of institutional practice that strikes a variable balance 
between territorial centralization and decentralization, and 
degrees of pluralization. The bureaucratic and coalitional nature of 
 
 402.  Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, & W. Michael Reisman, The World 
Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253, 262 (1967). 
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contemporary society and government permits the development of 
subloyalties and idiosyncratic value goals in different sectors of 
society and departments of government.403 
States are truly constitutive actors on the international stage. They 
fulfill an important role and have a significant amount of autonomy in 
transnational legal discourses. The map developed so far is a sketch of 
just these complexities and balances. It shows that states act as a 
check of federal power in foreign affairs and can serve as both a 
negative check and a positive impetus for U.S. participation in global 
affairs. It also outlines the limits of this power and the manner in 
which these limits create independent dynamics for global governance 
that have not so far been fully theorized. This leaves the question of 
whether these dynamics have independent value and, if so, what this 
value is. 
V. THE CONSTITUTIVE VALUE OF STATES OF RESISTANCE 
In the current political climate, it is tempting to think that the 
value of state participation in global governance networks is to act as 
a guardian of last resort.404 As this final part will outline, this is 
certainly one important value of state participation in global 
governance networks. It is, however, not the most transformative 
aspect of introducing states as constitutive actors on the global stage. 
Rather, the core value that states play is to provide a means to apply 
transnational legal process to competing global governance networks 
within a single polity. 
This core value of state participation has two momentous 
consequences. In the first instance, it creates instances of 
confrontation and engagement with and between the diverse values of 
global governance networks within a single polity. It thus creates new 
opportunities for the transnational legal process to function outside of 
a single global governance network.405 Second, the presence of 
irritants or states of resistance to dominant understandings of 
transnational legal process within a national community also serves a 
broader integrating role for transnational legal processes themselves. 
 
 403.  Id. at 263–64. 
 404.  Koh, supra note 9. 
 405.  Koh, supra note 135, at 2618. 
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A. Inverting the Rule of Exception: States as an Antidote to Executive 
Control 
Much ink has been spilled on the increasingly aggressive role 
played by the President in making international law around Congress. 
Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, in particular, in a recent article 
submitted that the Executive, and particularly the President, had 
assumed too great of a control over international lawmaking 
processes.406 Part of this argument is a direct consequence of the 
partisan gridlock in Congress, which would make it nearly impossible 
for a president to command the supermajority needed in the Senate 
(and depending upon the international lawmaking enterprise, in the 
House of Representatives) to follow ordinary constitutional processes 
for international lawmaking.407 
As the contemporary political environment so frequently invites 
comparisons to late 1920s and early 1930s Germany, this inability of 
democratic processes to function would conjure up the picture of 
executive rule-by-decree by the German Reichspresident and the 
eventual demise of democratic processes altogether.408 The arrogation 
of previously legislative power by the executive thus has worrying 
precedents in recent history. 
These worrying precedents have a common intellectual father in 
Carl Schmitt.409 Schmitt was the leading legal apologist for the 
increasingly dictatorial regime in Germany at the end of the Weimar 
Republic and into the Third Reich.410 Drawing in part on German 
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, Schmitt focused on the point of 
decision and argued that decision is ultimately dictatorial in the sense 
that some one person or entity must decide.411 Schmitt sought to prove 
this dictatorial nature of constitutional decisionmaking by focusing on 
 
 406.  See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26. 
 407.  See id. at 1260 n. 273 (relating the literature on the desirability of presidential action to 
theories about administrative action in light of Congressional gridlock). 
 408.  See Howard Wasserman, When the Nazis Became “The Nazis,” PRAWFSBLAWG (June 
23, 2018 at 11:05 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/06/when-did-the-nazis-
become-the-nazis.html (drawing the Trump/ National-Socialist comparison); Aziz Huq & Tom 
Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78, 93 (2018) (outlining 
the Weimar threat). 
 409.  See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, THE RISE AND 
FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 413–94 (2001) (discussing Schmitt in the context of 
his intellectual tradition). 
 410.  Id. at 430. 
 411.  Adam Thurschwell, Specters of Nietzsche: Potential Futures for the Concept of the 
Political in Agamben and Derrida, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1193, 1219 (2003). 
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states of exception or emergency.412 He submitted that all 
constitutions ultimately could be boiled down to this exceptional or 
emergency rule precisely because those moments identified who the 
one person with final decisional authority in a political system is.413 
The exception thus is not an isolated emergency but the foundational 
norm upon which an entire constitutional system stands.414 
If one were to follow the Schmittian analogy to the end, the 
arrogation of foreign affairs powers by the executive identified by 
Bradley and Goldsmith reveals a moment of exception.415 The 
Presidency holds exceptional power, particularly when all other 
means of legal engagement fail due to gridlock.416 The Presidency, in 
Schmittian terms, thus has quasi-dictatorial powers beyond domestic 
constitutional review to act on the global stage.417 
The arrival of states on the global stage, particularly in exceptional 
moments of federal defection from global governance networks, puts 
a significant damper on this conception of executive power.418 
Contrary to the Schmittian dictator, executive decision remains 
vulnerable to challenge and further litigation in the federal courts and 
deliberation in state and federal administrative agencies.419 The 
Presidency, therefore, does not have the last word or ultimate 
decisionmaking power at all. 
Interestingly, the availability of outright state resistance in the face 
of (some) federal defection from global governance networks again 
empowers Congress.420 If we follow Schmittian analysis of placing the 
power of decision in the body that ultimately must cut through the 
knot of indecision, the analysis outlined in this Article clearly points 
to Congress as the only body able to do so. 
The arrival of states as a counterweight to the federal executive 
therefore achieves organically what Bradley and Goldsmith seek to 
advocate by means of reform proposals: the return of Congress as the 
 
 412.  CARL SCHMITT, POLITISCHE THEOLOGIE 42 (1934). 
 413.  Id. 
 414.  Id. 
 415.  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 1260. Notably, Bradley & Goldsmith argue 
against this rationalization of presidential powers but nevertheless provide a powerful 
descriptive account of its apparent use. 
 416.  Id. 
 417.  SCHMITT, supra note 412, at 42. 
 418.  See Section IV.A. 
 419.  SCHMITT, supra note 412, at 42. 
 420.  See Section IV.A. 
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ultimate democratic decisionmaking organ even in matters of foreign 
affairs.421 Until Congress acts, the resistance by states is an important 
retardant of federal executive action that subjects federal executive 
action to the same kind of political forces of electoral gridlock 
affecting Congress.422 State participation in global governance 
networks and the states of resistance they can generate therefore go a 
long way towards defusing the specter of Schmittian foreign affairs 
decisionalism conjured in the literature. 
B. Creating Engagement – States of Resistance as Instances of Re-
Interpretation 
So far, the value of state participation in global governance 
networks appears limited to playing a spoilsport to executive 
overreach. Though meaningful in Schmittian terms, this would 
ultimately relegate the role of states to one of merely metaphysical 
importance. Exceptions, after all, are exceptional and thus not the 
ordinary concern of legal and policy process, pace the current 
administration. 
It is therefore important to map what value the irritant of state 
participation in global governance networks plays in ordinary times 
when the federal government does not seek to defect from existing 
commitments. As outlined in Section II, state participation in global 
governance networks is not limited to instances of defection. Rather, 
it is a constant companion of participation by states in networks 
different from those in which the federal government participates. It 
thus creates a constant drag on federal policy even when federal 
policy is aimed at international cooperation. 
In these ordinary situations, state participation in global 
governance networks and the softer resistance to federal policy is 
more valuable than the states’ exceptional checking power. State 
resistance creates moments of engagement between federal and state 
lawmakers, as Crosby so amply demonstrated.423 This engagement 
takes the form of legal argument in litigation—but it also takes the 
form of mutual engagement in legislative, or in some instances notice-
and-comment, procedures.424 These moments of engagement expose 
 
 421.  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 1270–97. 
 422.  See Section IV. 
 423.  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). 
 424.  GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 299. 
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each state and federal lawmaker to the norms and values that at core 
motivate the other’s law or rule. 
This exchange within existing policy processes replicates 
transnational legal process.425 It requires all actors to interpret the 
respective submissions upon which resistance is based.426 The federal 
government will interpret state submissions, state governments will 
interpret federal submissions, federal courts will weigh these 
submissions against each other, and so on. This process does more 
than result in an ultimate decision as to which policy the United 
States will follow with regard to a disputed measure. It showcases that 
there are additional values that must be taken into account when 
addressing policy questions at issue in global governance networks.427 
The fact of interpretation of the various submissions significantly 
leads to an internalization of the heterodox values that inform parallel 
global governance networks in the respective other global governance 
network.428 Each participant in a global governance network will take 
the input from its engagement with the respective other network back 
to the other network participants.429 This in turn will cause an 
opportunity for interpretation to all network participants,430 which in 
turn creates a diffusion of interpretation and norm internalization 
brought about by resistance within the U.S. constitutional system.431 In 
other words, a decision by a federal district court that a state and 
federal policy should continue side-by-side because they are 
consistent measures not preempted by federal legislation will inform 
policymaking outside the U.S. because federal and state participants 
in their respective networks will report on this result and its 
motivation. The networks in turn will grapple with the finding of 
consistency—and whether they wish to embrace and internalize it or 
resist it further. 
Resistance within one polity to the results of global governance 
networks on the basis of other such networks thus forces engagement 
between these networks.432 The conflict potential inherent in state 
 
 425.  Koh, supra note 135, at 2602. 
 426.  Id. at 2618. 
 427.  Id. 
 428.  Id. 
 429.  Id. 
 430.  Id. 
 431.  Id. 
 432.  See generally GRALF PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS, 
RUNNING CODE (2010). 
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participation in global governance networks therefore is a net good in 
further diffusing transnational legal values. It diffuses these values in 
the U.S. by exposing more policy makers to international norms they 
would otherwise have missed. These norms will in turn be internalized 
through interpretation, further strengthening the effects of the 
transnational legal process in fostering international norm compliance 
and cooperation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has been able to outline a new rubric of why and how 
states not only may participate in global governance networks but 
also may actively resist federal foreign policy. The Article has done so 
while also reconciling key cases that were traditionally considered to 
be incongruous with each other. It thus has provided a detailed 
predictive tool for how states could align their action in the future to 
maximize the effectiveness of their participation in global affairs. 
The Article has also pointed out that this participation by states 
creates an important value both in the U.S. and beyond by creating 
interfaces between different global governance networks. The 
interfaces created between different global governance networks by 
state resistance serve a broader purpose for international regimes. 
One of the inherent problems for global governance networks is that 
they tend to fragment the global normative landscape.433 Each 
network generates its own context dependent norms.434 These norms 
differ from the norms generated in other networks.435 These norms 
can frequently be inconsistent with each other.436 And there is 
ultimately no means of determining which norm is “correct,” as doing 
so would divorce norms from context in a manner that is made 
impossible by the global governance network infrastructure itself. 
States of Resistance provides a model of how these conflicts can 
nevertheless be resolved without the need for creating a hierarchy of 
networks.437 States can cause these different networks to engage each 
other and thus provide a means for the transnational legal process to 
work between transnational legal processes. This solution suggests that 
a flat engagement between different processes is indeed possible—
 
 433.  Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 199, at 1005. 
 434.  Id. 
 435.  Id. 
 436.  Id. (“If anywhere, it is here that the notion of a ‘clash of cultures’ is appropriate.”). 
 437.  SLAUGHTER, supra note 20, at 132. 
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and that the work to comprehend how this engagement takes place 
critically depends upon a proper understanding of frequently 
overlooked constitutive actors in world society. 
 
